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ABSTRACT

In 1841, with the involvement of European powers, the Ottoman
Empire distinguished by Firman territory subject to a Khedive of Egypt
from that subject more directly to Istanbul.

With British pressure in

1906, a more formal boundary was established between Egypt and Ottoman
Palestine.

This study focuses on these events and on the history from

1841 to the present.

The study area includes the Sinai peninsula and

extends from the Suez Canal in the west to what is today southern Israel
from Ashqelon on the Mediterranean to the southern shore of the Dead Sea
in the east.

Both alterations in the boundary and changes in its

function are considered.

A set of maps describes the stages of boundary

development and changes in its exact location.
Subsequent to Mohammed Ali's 1831 invasion and occupation of
Ottoman Palestine and Syria, intervention by Eur?pean powers led to
Egyptian withdrawal and a determination in 1841 of a line running from
Rafah to Suez as a limit to Egyptian authority.
The political and economic importance of the area increased with
the development of the Suez Canal in 1869.
militarily in Egypt in 1882.

Britain intervened

The British goal of using the Sinai as a

buffer for the Canal led in 1906 to forced Ottoman recognition of the
Rafah-Aqaba line as the administrative boundary between Egypt and
Ottoman Palestine.

Following World War I, both sides of the boundary

came under British control by the League of Nations awarding of the
Palestine Mandate to Britain.
The impor~ance of the boundary was enhanced by the hostilities
incident upon the establishment of an independent Israel in 1948.

The

location of the boundary essentially survived the wars of 1948, 1956,

1967, and 1973.

Following the demarche of the Egyptian Government in

1977 and the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979,
the two states turned to the re-demarcation of the 1906 line and to the
~

resolution of disputes.

Today the line of 1906, the oldest in the

modern Middle East, serves as Israel's only mutually recognized
international boundary.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Throughout the last two centuries, territorial disputes and
boundary-related issues have been a major factor in conflicts between
states.

Frontiers, as an integral part of territorial sovereignty, play

a crucial role in the life of nations; keeping their integrity is one of
the most important conditions for the existence of the state, and
usually events along the state's frontier area will affect the behavior
of the w~ole country.

Since the rise of nation-states in the 17th

century, powerful neighbors have tended to expand and claim the
territories of weaker ones, and it is commonly believed that boundary
disputes will never disappear.
The concept of boundaries evolved after the collapse of the Holy
Roman Empire in Europe which was followed by the Peace of Westphalia in
1648 and the emergence of modern Western European states.

Boundary

lines were still alien terms for nomadic societies of the Middle East at
the beginning of the 20th century.

These societies were characterized

by frequent movement, and their territories could expand and narrow to
accomodate transhumance.

Middle Eastern tribes maintained real

territorial independence by temporal separation or the creation of "no
man's lands" between them.

Therefore, it is not surprising that in the

last few decades all throughout the Middle East territorial disputes
have been a direct motive behind conflicts between states.

As of 1992

there is still no single Middle Eastern country which has no territorial
claims or disputes with at least one of its neighbors.

Although many of
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the disputes are inactive, the unresolved ones can cause the eruption of·
conflicts and major wars which may threaten the fragile stability of the
region, e.g., in Kuwait during 1990.
The weakening of the Ottoman Empire throughout the 19th century
until its collapse in the beginning of the 20th century led to new
territorial arrangements in the Middle East between the victorious
European powers in the First World War.

Britain and France exercised

direct and indirect control over most of the area.

These colonial

powers considered their own interests and placed less weight on
geographical and hwnan factors when they partitioned the area and drew
the boundaries between the new states.

The superimposed boundaries were

mostly straight lines through the sand which cut through tribes and
peoples who generally share homogenity and the same historical
background and inspiration of unity, e.g. Kurds were split among Turkey,
Iraq, Syria and Iran.

Furthermore, the fact that most of the Middle

East is desert area and border lines cross these areas adds yet another
difficulty in keeping boundaries undisputed.

Nothing is permanent in

the desert; landforms change through time with the weathering effects of
climate (e.g., shifting sand dunes) and there is no permanently settled
population in many areas to mark boundary changes.

Most of the boundary

lines which were allocated and delimited by the colonial powers were
never demarcated.

This important stage was left to the successor

states.
By the end of the 19th century the British Empire, the greatest
power on the seas, was a major European country facing the declining
Ottoman Empire and playing a major role in the Levant, in Egypt, and
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elsewhere.

In this period many political boundaries were drawn by the

British and other European powers around the world, especially in Africa
and Asia.

British policy-makers based their experience on elaborate

concepts and rules regarding boundary lines.
George Nathaniel Curzon, Lord Curzon of Kedleston, held many
positions in the British foreign and colonial offices, served as viceroy
in India and was involved in many boundary commissions.

In 1907 Curzon

gave a lecture at Oxford University titled "Frontiers."

From his

lecture, which was delivered one year after the 1906 British-Ottoman
crisis over the eastern frontier of Egypt, we can learn much about the
principles of boundary-drawing in the minds of British policy-makers.
These principles were behind the British position in the BritishOttoman confrontation of 1906 (see Chapter 4).

Lord Curzon and others

highly valued the desert of Sinai as a natural ba~rier; it is more
impassible than the sea and "has retained a physical identity almost
unequalled in history" (Curzon, 1907, p. 15).
To support his point, Lord Curzon cited Napolean's Commentaries.
"The greatest captain of modern times" wrote:
Generals who have marched from Egypt to Syria or from Syria
to Egypt have in all periods of history considered this
desert the greater obstacle the larger the number of horses
they took with them . . . . This obstacle, however, was not
so great in ancient times as it is to-day, since towns and
villages existed, and the industry of man contended with
success against the difficulties. To-day scarcely anything
remains between Salihiyeh and Gaza. An army must,
therefore, cross the desert successively by forming
establishments and magazines at Salihiyeh, Katieh, and El
Arish. If this army starts from Syria it must first of all
form a large magazine at El Arish, and then carry it forward
to Katieh. But these operations are slow, and they give an
enemy time to make his preparations for defense . . . . An
army defending Egypt can either assemble at El Arish to
oppose the investment of this place, or at Katieh to raise
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the siege of El Arish, or at Salihiyeh: all these
alternatives offer advantages. Of all obstacles which may
cover the frontiers of empires, a desert like this is
incontesably the greatest. Mountains like the Alps take
second rank, and rivers the third. If there is so much
difficulty in carrying the food of an army that complete
success is rarely obtained, this difficulty becomes twenty
times greater when it is necessary to carry water, forage,
and fuel, three things which are weighty, difficult to
carry, and usually found by armies upon the ground they
occupy. (Curzon, 1907, p. 16)
_The British, having interests in India and Southeast Asia,
wanted to continue their control over the Suez Canal, the lifeline of
their empire, and the area adjacent to it (see Chapter 3, ,,·Imperial
interests . . . ").

The boundary line they imposed was extended about 120

miles east of the Suez Canal to include the Sinai peninsula in order to
se~e as a buffer zone between the Canal and the Ottoman provinces of
Syria and Al-Hijaz.

After several attempts to prevent this, the

Ottomans were forced in October 1906 to demarcate the boundary line
which extended from Rafah to Aqaba (see Chapter 4).

After World War I

the League of Nations confirmed a British Mandate over Palestine.

From

that time until 1948, Great Britain controlled both sides of the
boundary line, minimizing its importance.

The entrance of a new factor

to the area, represented by the World Zionist Movement and later by the
creation of the State of Israel in 1948, renewed the importance of the
boundary.
While there were several attempts to question the legality of the
1906 line and to change it after its demarcation, it remained untouched
until 1948.

After Israel's establishment and the several wars between

Israel and Egypt which followed, the boundary line passed through
various changes.
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The importance of the boundary of 1906 between Egypt and Israel
rests on the facts that it is the oldest one in the region, that is the
political boundary between two continents, and that is virtually the
only mutually recognized international boundary Israel has with its Arab
neighbors.

The process of its creation started out as a "separate

administrative line" in 1906 and ended as a de-jure boundary between
neighboring countries after the Peace Treaty of 1979.
This thesis will explore the boundary line since its inception in
1841 up until 1992, how it was demarcated between the Ottoman and
British empires in 1906, what factores were behind the demarcation of
1906 and·the changes made since that time, and how the functions of the
boundary line have changed over the years.

The study area will include

the Sin~i Peninsula, from the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez, in the
west to southern Israel, from Ashqelon on the Mediterranean Sea to the
southern point of the Dead Sea, including the Gaza Strip, in the east.
This research will not attempt to cover maritime boundaries.
Placenames are rendered in English according to the usage of the
1970 Second (English) Edition of the Atlas of Israel.

This is the sole

atlas or gazeteer published in English by any Middle Eastern country.
Use of this source was the product of some unfortunate Hebraicization of
Arabic placenames.

However, there does exist some variation in Arabic

transliterations (reflecting regional usage), and the Atlas has become
an important source for English-speaking cartographers (John Bartholomew
&

Son, 1985).

Variation between the Hebrew and Arabic is not as serious

in this edition of The Atlas as in other Israeli sources.

In the few

instances where places are not listed in this source, usage follows that
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of the Rand McNally Illustrated Atlas of the Middle East.

The gazeteers

published by the United States Board on Geographic Names (The National
Gazeteers of the United States of America Documents/Maps, 1990) are used
as guides to which names are most usefully rendered conventionally,
rather than transliterated (e.g., Jerusalem, rather than Al Quds or
Yerushlayim).

Unfortunately for purposes here, these gazeteers

transliterate differently in different state-based volumes (e.g.,
"shaykh" and "sheikh") and the use of their listings would be confusing
here where the controlling state changes.
The maps presented here serve as accompaniments and illustrations
for the text.
purposes.

They are much simplified and are not intended for general

In specific instances they generalize or approximate actual

geographic features, where such treatment is appropriate to the text and
does not substantially distort depiction.

Scale is approximate.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SINAI PENINSULA

The Physical Geography of Sinai
The Sinai peninsula is triangular in shape, lying between the
latitudes of 27° 30. N and 31° 30. N between the continents of Africa
and Asia.

While the Mediterranean Sea forms a base of the triangle in

the north, Ras Muhammad composes its peak in the south.

The Sinai

peninsula is bordered by the Gulf of Aqaba in the east and the Gulf of
Suez in the west.

Both of them are connected with the Red Sea in the

south (se·e Figure 1).
60,000 km2 •

The peninsula expands to cover an area of over

From north to south it spans a distance of 400 km from

Rafah on the Mediterranean Sea to Ras Muhammad on the Red Sea coast;
from east to west it spans a distance of 190 km from Rafah to Qantara
(Efrat & Orni, 1973. p. 125).
The peninsula is divided into three main regions according to
elevation.

The southern portion is mountainous and mostly conposed of

crystalline rocks.

This area rises to an elevation of 2,000 m and

within it lies the highest point in Sinai, Jabal Kathrina, at 2,637 m
(7,911 ft).
Monastery.

On one of its slopes is situated the famous St. Catherine
Not far from that, Moses's Mountain rises to 2,285 m (6,855

ft), which is considered to be the Mount Sinai where Moses received the
Ten Commandments.

The central part of Sinai is called the At-Tih

plateau and forms 60% of the total area of the Sinai peninsula.

It

rises between 400-1,000 m, with a few cases in which there are mountains
which exceed this height.

The plateau is mainly composed of limestone
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and dolomite.

The third portion of the peninsula contains the northern

plain and is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea.

Although some hills and

mountains rise in this region, it is basically flat with two major hill
chains crossing the area from northeast to southwest making
communication from east to west difficult.

The topograghic obstacles

give the passes of Gidi and Mitla (see Figure 2) in the southern edges
of the plain a strategic advantage (see Chapter 7).

The northernmost

20-39 km of the Sinai Mediterranean coast is made up of sand dunes which
extend a distance of 230 km east to west (Efrat & Orni, 1973, pp. 123131).
Climatologically, the Sinai peninsula lies within the subtropical
desert zone which extends from the western edges of the Sahara desert to
the eastern fringes of the Arabian peninsula.
arid, precipitation being very scarce.
(95° F) in the summer.

The climate is hot and

Temperatu~es often peak at 35° C

The summer nights are cold and temperature drops

to 15° C (59° F), making a range of 20° C (36° F) which is very typical
of desert conditions.

Mean annual precipitation is less than four

inches and 50% of Sinai receives less than two inches.

The desert is

generally barren except for a few shrubs and grasses which support
nomadic grasses (Atlas of the Middle East, 1979, pp. 19-21).
The harsh climate of the desert can explain the sparse population
distribution.

The population of Sinai is concentrated around very

limited suitable land for agriculture, mainly around the town of ElArish and on the banks of the El-Arish valley in the northeastern
portion of Sinai.

Throughout most historical periods, the population of

Sinai was mainly nomadic and semi-nomadic.

By 1917 only 5,430
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inhabitants lived in Sinai.

The Egyptian Government estimated that

prior to the the Six Days War, 130,000 persons lived in Sinai, the
majority of them in the northern part of the peninsula.

According to an

Israeli census conducted in the end of 1967, only 33,441 persons lived
in northern Sinai and few thousand others in the rest of the peninsula
(Efrat & Orni, 1973, p. 381).
Prior to the 1946 discovery of oil.in Sinai, mineral resources were
considered very limited.

Among the minerals which were later exploited

by the Egyptians and the Israelis, between 1967-1978, were maganese,
copper, iron, gypsum, and glass sands.

Oil was discovered near the town

of Suez alongside the Gulf of Suez in 1946.

Today the major wells of

Sinai are in Ras es-Sudar and Abu Rudeis (see Figure 2).
more wells during the early 1970s.

Israel drilled

Egypt demanded and received the oil

fields in the Second Disengagement Agreement of 1975 (see Chapter 7).
Although the road network is presently not well developed,
throughout history the Sinai peninsula served as a gateway from east to
west between Egypt on one side and Arabia. and the Levant on the other.
The well-known ancient roads were the Sea Road in the north section of
Sinai which connected the Nile civilization with Mesopotamia via Qantara
and El-Arish (see Figure 2).

The second road is Shur, which today

extends between Nizzana (called Auja before 1953) and Ismailiya on the
west bank of the Suez Canal.

One theory stated that. this route was used

by Moses and the Israelites in their exodus from Egypt (Efrat & Orni,
1973, p. 369).
Road.

The third road is Darb El-Haj or the famous Pilgrims'

It extends from Suez via the Mitla pass to en Nahl and Aqaba.

Prior to the operation of the Suez Canal, Egyptian and North African
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· pilgrims used this route to the.holy places in Mecca and Medina.
Moreover, it was used by the Ottoman Turks during their 1915 assault on
the Suez Canal Zone and also by the Israeli military during the 1956 and
1967 wars.

The length of the pilgrims route within Sinai is 240 km

(Efrat & Orni, 1973, p. 370).

Today, the major routes in the Sinai

peninsula crossing from north to south are from Elat to Sharm esh Sheikh
along the eastern edges of Sinai and from Port Said to Sharm esh Sheikh
in the west.

The Egyptian Government heavily invested in the Sinai road

network and there is a plan to connect Sinai with the Saudi Arabian
coast via the Straits of Tiran (Shezif, 1992, pp. 18-19).

The Historical Geography of Sinai
The human history of the Sinai peninsula is very old, dated back
to the kingdoms of ancient Egypt in the third and fourth millenia before
the common era (B.C.E.).

This area served as a crossroads between

civilizations, mainly be.tween the Nile Valley and Mesopotamia.
Hyksos invaded Egypt through Sinai around 1670.

The

The founders of the New

Kingdom of Egypt expelled the Hyksos around 1570 and in turn drove
across the Sinai and conquered Palestine by 1460 Mount Sinai in the
peninsula is known as the place in which Moses received the Ten
Commandments, and the Sinai desert was the wilderness in which Moses led
the Israelite tribe after they were freed from Egyptian captivity.
The armies of other kingdoms and dynasties throughout the first
millenium crossed Sinai to conquer Egypt.
Assyrians in 668.

This was the case with the

The Persian Cambyses followed in 526.

Between the

years 333-323, Alexander the Great marked the birth of the Hellenistic
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period in Egypt.

Later, the Romans and Byzantines conquered Egypt

respectively.

The famous Santa Catherine Monastery was built in the

Byzantine era.

The former Byzantine domain over Egypt ended in the

seventh century when Muslim leader Amr ibn El-As crossed Sinai and
advanced into Egypt in 640 C.E.

Several Muslim dynasties ruled Egypt

after that, including the Umayyed and Abbasid Caliphates (640-969).
They were followed by the Fatimid from 969-1171, the Ayyubid from 11711250, and the Mamluks from 1250-1517 (Haddad & Nijim, 1989, pp. 145147).

Given the period covered in this essay, Ritter's classic 1866

work remains an useful general reference to the ancient geography of the
area (Ritter, 1968).

The Ottoman Administrative Division of Egypt and the Levant
In 1515 the Turkish military, led by Selim I,, advanced into Syria
and Palestine, occupying the area in 1515 and 1516.

They crossed the

Sinai peninsula and conquered Egypt, defeating the Mamluks in 1517.
Generally speaking, the Ottomans did not disturb the political
arrangements and ethnic composition of the conquered territories;
moreover, they did not settle in large numbers within the new
territories annexed to their Anatolian base and forming the Ottoman
Empire.
The administrative division of the Ottoman Empire followed the
patttern set down by the Mamluks.
provinces.

It was divided into vilayets or

The vilayets were subdivided into administrative units

called sanjaks or liva, meaning districts, which were further subdivided
into kada or counties.

There were 26 vilayets in the Ottoman Empire,
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five of them in Egypt.

The newly occupied territories were governed by

an Ottoman viceroy who was sent from Istanbul by the Ottoman Government.
While the Ottomans called the governor Vali, the Egyptians called him
Pasha.

The Vali was in charge of managing the financial, religious, and

military activities in his own vilayet. In other areas, the government
remained in the hands on Mamluk Beys, under the Vali's supervision.
From the natives the Ottomans demanded loyalty and payment of taxes
(Efendi, 1966. p. 4).
horse tail.

The title of Vali was distinguished by a Tug, or

The Sultan of Istanbul had six horse tails, the Valis had

three, and the Sanjakbeys had only one tail (Stanford, 1962, p.· 9).
By the end of the 19th century, Egypt was divided into 24 sanjaks,
most of them concentrated along the Nile River.

Only one sanjak

(Salihiyeh) was in the Sinai peninsula (Efendi, 1966; pp. 36-37; see
Figure 3).

Palestine, which at that time was called Southern Syria, was

not an administrative division.

It was split between the Vilayet of

Beirut (the northern section) and the Vilayet of Syria.

During the

1870s the importance of the holy places in Jerusalem led the Ottomans to
form a new Sanjak of Jerusalem, which was under the direct control of
the Sultan of Istanbul.
Lebanon.

Another sanj ak formed was the Sanj ak of

It was established after the massacre of the Maronite

community by the Druze in 1860.
three villayets:

In the 1870s, Syria was divided into

Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo; Mesopotamia was also

divided into three:

Basra, Bagdad, and Mosul (Baylson, 1987, pp. 63-

65).

Unlike other tributary states and provinces in the Ottoman Empire,
Egypt was only loosely Connected to the Ottoman central government.

15

Mediterranean Sea

i
N

0

100 miles

E3

MOSUL

llill

BAGHDAD

-

Pilgrimage Route

A1-Muw ay lih

AL-HIJAZ
Based on: (Pitcher, 1972).

Figure 3.

Egypt of the Khedive and Principle Ottoman
Sub-Divisions of the Levant in the Early 1880s.

16
This situation continued until World War I.

The Ottomans were

challenged as early as the 17th century by the Mamluks, a people of
Circassian origin and the decendents of military "slaves" who had been
brought to Egypt since the Middle Ages and had ruled Egypt until 1517
(Weigall, 1915, p. 52).

Although Egypt continued to pay annual taxes to

the Sultan of Istanbul, it was under the Mamluks' practical control.
The situation did not bother the Ottomans as long as Egypt paid revenues
and participated in the Ottoman army.

Holt (1966) provides useful

chronologicies and geneologies for the period 1516-1922.

Egypt During the 18th Century
In 1798 Napolean Bonaparte initiated a military campaign to conquer
Egypt.

His goal was to interrupt the British communication links to

India.

After completing his occupation of Egypt, he advanced into

Palestine.

He crossed Sinai and reached Sidon in southern Lebanon.

Napolean's campaign failed to gain any political advantages for France.
However, the British perceived Napolean as a serious threat to their
imperial interests.
Egypt.

They were determined to expel the French from

By 1801 the British occupied Egypt and in 1802 they expelled the

French and restored the Mamluk governor to power (Lenczowski, 1980, p.

34).
Mohammed Ali, an Albanian of strong personality, was an officer
sent by the Ottomans to Egypt to fight the French.

When the French and

the British left the country in 1803, he defeated all local competing
factions, including the Mamluks, and became viceroy in 1805.

Ali

strengthed his rule and introduced a new policy of openness towards
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Europe.

He had friendly relations with the French who trained and

equipped his army.

By the 1820s, Ali's army was strong enough to carry

out several military campaigns against the Wahhabis, Greeks, and
Sudanese, and finally to stage an uprising against his suzerian, the
Sultan of Istanbul (Perets, 1962, pp. 191-192).

The intervention of

Britain and other European countries against Mohammed Ali's expansion in
1840 forced him to evacuate Greater Syria, a territory he had occupied
in 1831-1832.
The power vacuum left by Ali in Greater Syria and the political
circumstances in the Ottoman Empire enhanced British power in the area.
Increasingly since their gradual domination of India, the main goal of
the British Government was the protection of the trade routes between
·.Europe and India and the maintenance of a complete British naval
monopoly in the Indian Ocean.
Suez Canal and .after.
to India.

This was true before the creation of the

Before, Britain- moved to secure two land routes

The first was by sea to Alexandria and over land to Suez,

then by water from the Red Sea to the. Indian Ocean.

Britain planned as

early as 1839 to construct a railway from Alexandria to Suez via Cairo,
but it failed to carry the plan out until the 1850s for local reasons.
The second route was via the northern section of the Syrian desert along
the Euphrates and then to the Persian Gulf.

Durin& the 19th century,

Great Britain occupied several strategic places along the route to India
and signed various ag~eements with several countries.
made a defensive alliance with Persia.

In 1814 Britain

Earlier it guaranteed control

over Malta in 1803·and the Ionian Islands in 1809.

It signed a treaty

with·the Trucial States in 1820 . . The acquisition of Aden in 1839
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followed (Baylson, 1987, p. 48).

The creation of the Suez Canal in 1869

enhanced the importance of Egypt and the areas adjacent.
Britain moved to occupy Cyprus (see Figure 3).
occupied Egypt itself.

In 1878

Then four years later it

Britain controlled the new sea route to India

and needed to establish the boundaries of the territory of Egypt in
which it ruled.

Britain demanded a clear demarcation between Egypt and

Ottoman territory through the Sinai.

The Importance of the Boundary and Related Studies
The Egypt-Sinai boundary is of special interest for many scholars.
Geographers, lawyers, historians, and political scientists have
contributed to its study.

The number and diversity of the writers

indicates not only the importance of the boundary but the different
countries involved.

While geographers are intere~ted in the 1906 line

as an element affecting the cultural landscape, lawyers are interested
in the determination of the limit of the judicial system and the
sovereignty of the states adjacent to the boundary line.

Historians

have analyzed the boundary changes though different periods, and
political scientists are interested in the administration of the state
in the frontier as well as in the core or the center.
The importance of the boundary line between Egypt and Palestine,
and between Egypt and Israel since 1948, is derived first and foremost
from its location.

This boundary forms the limit of the political

boundary between the African and Asian continents.

An obvious question

is, if the Suez Canal had not been created in the 1870s, whether the
continental boundary would be located farther east, e.g., at the Isthmus
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of Suez, which seems more natural.

A second factor making the boundary

important is that it is the oldest modern boundary in the Middle East.
Although the boundary has changed for brief periods with opposing armies
crossing it several times, it has remained permanent since its
delimitation in 1906.
Moreover, the Egypt-Palestine boundary became an international
boundary without any signed agreements between the states involved.
boundary was imposed by the British on the Ottoman Empire.

The

It was an

administrative line until 1915 when Great Britain unilaterally declared
the secession of Egypt from the Ottoman Empire.

The Egypt-Israel line

became a mutually recognized international boundary de-jure for the
first time in 1978 when the two countries, represented by their leaders
President Anwar Al-Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of
Israel, signed the Camp David Agreement under the,auspices of the Carter
Administration.

The fact that the Egypt-Israel boundary line is the

only international boundary between Israel and the neighboring Arab
countries adds further weight to its significance.

Israel still has

cease-fire, disengagement and armistice lines with Jordan, Syria, and
Lebanon, respectively.
Literature and resources regarding the boundary line and its
development are available, especially in English, Arabic, and Hebrew.
The English literature is written mostly by scholars as academic
research.

One of the most remarkable sources is Palestine Boundaries

1833-1947 edited by P. Toye (1989).
detailed

This documentary reference is a

account of the political activities related to the boundary

issue conducted between London and Cairo on one hand, and Istanbul on
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the other.

Lord Cramer's book Modern Egypt (1908) contains detailed

memoirs of the British Governor of Egypt during his service there.
Other research in English is largely academic and objective, but is
limited in scope and to particular periods.
Much of the Israeli and Zionist literature regarding the boundary
issue is tendentious.

As one might expect, Israeli writers are affected

by their national or ethnic interests.

Due to the fact that all of the

1948 Israeli boundaries were officially temporary, many Israelis believe
that the Jewish State's boundary problem is part of the issue of its
very existence.

This has made Israeli literature less objective.

Moshe

Brawer, a leading Israeli expert on the boundary issue, argues in his
book Erets-Israel Boundaries, Past, Present and Future, that·Israeli
officials, in the redemarcation of the boundary in 1982, showed
ignorance and negligence.
error (1982, p. 7).

He described the arrangement as a new major

More typically, Martin Gilbert, who published Atlas

of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1974), describes the boundary conflict
from a Zionist perspective as a series of Arab penetrations and attacks
on Jewish settlement in Palestine (p. 40).
Egyptians generally do not believe the existence of Egypt depends
on its exact boundaries or its neighbor's recognition.
problems do appear.
objectivity.

But similar

Treatment often involves emotions and lack of

Mahmood El-Deeb, in his book Palestine Boundaries (1979),

claims that the eastern Egyptian boundary runs from Rafah to Aqaba.

He

extends the boundary to include the east coast of the Gulf of Aqaba and
farther south in Saudi Arabian territories (p. 114).

Unlike other

scholars, he derives this boundary according to the Ottoma Firman of
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1841, recognizing Mohammed Ali's relative independence.

Moreover, the

Taha Conflict and the other disputed points along the boundary became
for the Egyptian writers a "national issue."

This is true for example

in Abdel Hai's book Taha (1991) and Rizik's Taha, the Generation Problem
(1989).

The amount of literature regarding the Taha Arbitration exceeds

the literature otherwise written about the boundary since its
establishment.

Unfortunately, the peace treaty of 1979 between Egypt

and Israel, and the re-demarcation of the boundary, did not make the
literature less emotional or more objective.
Rushdi Merlo Pasha, the Turkish officer stationed at Aqaba during
the Crisis of 1906, wrote a memior on the crisis titled Aqaba Affair
(1910).

He stated that the conflict with Britain was not over a few

miles around Taha, but rather over the entire area of Palestine (p. 20).
Similar

problems for Israelis and Egyptians appear in current

literature.
Generally, the wealth of literature does not cover the whole story
of·the Egypt-Palestine/Israel boundary.

Not only is it limited in scope

and by time period, but also in objectivity and fairness.

Much

theoretical and comparative literature exists-geographic, legal,
historical, philosophical, etc. about the nature and purposes of
boundaries.

Glassner and de Blig (1989, pp. 134-153) provide an

intitial bibliography from the geographic perspective.

To treat and

apply this literature to the Egypt-Palestine/Israel boundary will likely
be focus for future work.

The purpose of this essay is to provide a

continuous descriptive account of the Egypt-Palestine/Israel boundary
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from 1841 to the present.

The development of the boundary line and

changes in its functions are considered.

23

CHAPTER 3
THE EGYPT-OTTOMAN BOUNDARY BEFORE 1906

Imperial Interests in the Middle East Before the 1906 Incident
The European powers' interests in the Middle East were connected
with routes for shipping and trade with the Far East.

The competition

between Great Britain and France over India in the 18th century elevated
the overall importance of the Middle East, especially Egypt.

Even

before the creation of the Suez Canal, Egyptian territories were
important for European powers as a route for trade with India and the
Far East via Suez and the Red Sea.

For the British, this route saved

4,500 miles or three months on the voyage from London to Calcutta; while
the other route took five months via the Atlantic and Indian Oceans
around the Cape, it took just two months via Egypt (Drysdale & Blake,
1985, p. 51).
France had played a major role in Egypt since the occupation staged
by Napolean in 1798.

France had a strong relationship with Mohammed

Ali, ruler of Egypt 1805-1848.

In 1840, France, which trained and

equipped Mohammed Ali's army, was the only European power which failed
to rush support to the Ottoman Sultan when Ali's army threatened his
overthrow.

The rivalry over Egypt between France and Great Britain

accelerated after the creation of the Suez Canal.

While the major

investor in the canal, France, had received the concession to build it
in 1854, Britain was the major user and benefactor after 1869.

The

status of Egypt was drastically altered after the British moved in and
took control over the Canal Zone.

Since it was their lifeline to India,
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the British were very careful in their administration so as not to
arouse the hostility of the populace and thereby avoid any troubles
which would threaten their general interests.

The French earlier held

influence over Egyptian affairs, but after British domination, Egypt
became a vital link in Indian trade.

The Anglo-French rivalry over the

status of Egypt marked the two European powers' relations for more than
a century and finally ended in 1904 when the two countries settled this
divisive colonial conflict in the Entene Cordiale of April 1904.
According to the agreement, France gave up in her quest for Egypt and
accepted the de facto British occupation; in return, Great Britain
accepted French dominance over Morroco (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p. 51).
Another factor which complicated the geopolitics of the Middle East
in the late 19th century and the early years of the 20th century was the
rise of a unified Germany.

The German Empire shared a close

relationship with the Ottomans.

Their economic activitities were

enhanced when in 1893 the Ottoman Sultan granted a concession to a
German company to build a railway from Istanbul to the Persian Gulf
through Baghdad (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p. 55).

German economic and

military aid to the Ottomans strengthened the diplomatic relationship
between the two countries.

According to Warburg, the German ambassador

in Istanbulwas behind the suggestion of the omission of Sinai from an·
1892 investiture firman of the Khedive 1 (Warburg, 1979, p. 681).

The

German strategy under Bismark was to play off the British against the
Ottomans so as not to give the British any strategic advantages in the
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region, e.g. control over Sinai.

Heyd. (1963) suggests that the British-

Ottoman crisis of 1906 was part of the Anglo-German competition over
economic interests and hegemony in the Ottoman Empire (p. 201).
The concession which was given to the German company upset the
British who claimed hegemony over the Middle East and were concerned by
the German advances in the region.

One of the most important sections

in the Istanbul-Gulf railway was the section which was planned by
Germany to Basra and the Persian Gulf (see Figure 4).

The competition

over this section would give the Germans very important strategic access
to the Persian Gulf which the British viewed as a threat to their route
to India due to its geographic proximity.

The British wanted to thwart

any possible German intrusions into the region before they ever got off
the ground.

To foil the German plan, the British reached an agreeement

with Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait.

In response, the Ottomans and the

Germans incited Ibn Rashead, the tribal leader of central Arabia,
against the Kuwaiti sheikh.

But Ibn Rashead and the Ottoman troops who

rushed to join him were defeated in 1904 by Abid El-Aziz Bin Saud, who
came to support the Kuwaiti sheikh.

1

With this stunning success of a

Khedive or viceroy, a title of Persian origin given by the
Ottoman Sultan to Ismail Pasha, the grandson of Mohammed Ali, in 1870.
Ismail was not satisfied with being a nominal ruler and wanted the
Sultan to greatly expand his authorities so he could make treaties and
establish diplomatic relations with European powers. He requested to be
called Aziz or Almighty. The Sultan refused and gave him the title of
Khedive, which is less pretentious than Aziz (Weigall, 1915, p. 91).
The title was used by other Egyptian rulers until 1914.
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British foreign policy initiative in the region, the strategic Persian
Gulf coastal area of Kuwait fell under British control and influence,
thereby thwarting German ambitions and ending plans for the railway
(Heyd, 1963, p. 202).
The fate of the Damascus-Al-Hijaz railway proposals was similar
(see Figure 4).

The Sultan had hoped that the construction of the

railway would improve his position in the Islamic world and ease the
burden of pilgrims to Mecca.

The project started in 1900 and by the end

of 1904 it reached a point, just 100 km east of Aqaba.

The Ottomans

planned to link Aqaba with the project, which would free them from
reliance ·upon the British-controlled Suez Canal.

The British foreign

office was very concerned with the possibility of the Ottomans
constructing a branch to Aqaba.

According to the British command in

Egypt, such a project would threaten the sea route to India and the Far
East and enhance Egyptian vulnerability (Khalidi, 1980, p. 21).
The Ottomans, who perceived the British occupation of Egypt as only
temporary and the delimitation of an El-Arish-Aqaba line as only an
administrative one, did not abandon their claims over Egypt.

A possible

confrontation with the British over Sinai would enhance the Sultan's
position in the minds of the Egyptian population.

Moreover, the

political situation in Egypt was extremely volatile.

The nationalist

movement in Egypt led by Mustafa Kamil El-Rifai was very powerful and
supported the Sultan against the British.

The victory of Japan over

~-

Russia in 1904-05 increased the confidence of the Egyptian population in
confronting a European power (Warburg, 1979, p. 692).
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The Egypt-Ottoman Rivalry over the .Eastern Egyptian Frontier
Since the occupation of Egypt and Syria by the Ottoman Turks, the
Sinai peninsula had been the administrative ·boundary between the
province of Egypt and the province of Syria (see Figure 3).

The Sinai,

a harsh desert sparsely populated by Bedouin tribes, captured little
Ottoman administrative attention.

While the provinces of Egypt and

Syria paid annual taxes to the Sultan in Istanbul, the Bedouin tribes
received an annual sum of money for allowing Islamic pilgrims to pass
safely through the desert to Mecca and Medina with their protection
(Stanford, 1962, p. 27).
The eastern Egyptian frontier took shape for the first time after
the occupation of Syria by the forces of Ibrahim Pasha during the 1830s.
Ibrahim Pasha, general and son of Mohammed Ali who led an earlier
Egyptian revolt against the Ottomans, was threatening the Sultan's
overthrow.

By 1833 he reached as close as 100 km to Istanbul, and for

the following eight years (1833-1841) Egyptian forces exercised control
over the area from the Nile Valley to the Taurus Mountains in. southern
Auatolia (Biger, 1978, p. 323).
In 1840, the European powers of Austria-Hungary, Prussia, Russia
and Great Britain intervened to protect the Ottoman throne and halt
Ali's ambitions.

They regarded him as a threat to the peace of Europe

in general and their overseas interests in particular.

As a result,

Ali's troops were forced to vacate their occupied Ottoman territories.
In compensation, Sultan Mahmud II with consent of the European powers,
issued an imperial edict .(firman) to Mohammed Ali allowing him and his
heirs control of Egypt (Hurewitz, 1989, p.· xiv).
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Egypt's effective independence had been recognized internationally
in the 1840 Treaty of London (Vatikiotis, 1991; p. 59).

The Firman of

1841 recognized Egypt's status and regularized it within the Ottoman
Empire.

Thus, the Firman of 1841 and later firmans (e.g., 1866, 1869,

1872, 1873, and 1892) had quasi-constitutional status for Egypt
(Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 60).

They recognized or regularized the Egyptian

succession, form of government, treaty and borrowing powers, etc.

The

Firman of 1892 will be seen to be especially important in the EgyptianPalestine boundary.
Contained in the firman was a map showing the extent of control for
Ali and his successors.

This was the first map to indicate the eastern

frontier in the formation of a sovereign Egypt (see Figure 5).
According to the accompanying map, the .boundary ran from a point just
east of Rafah (between Rafah and Khan Yunis) on the Mediterranean to
Suez, giving Egypt contol over only the northwest portion of the Sanai
peninsula (Hurewitz, 1989, p. xiv).

There is a widely held belief that

the only two copies of the 1841 map were lost forever (Biger, 1978, p.
325; Mitwali, 1989, p. 11).

The map deprived Egypt of the rest of Sinai

and of Al-Muwaylih, Ziba and Al-Wajh, areas along the east coast of the
Gulf of Aqaba in the pilgrimage route to Mecca.

These areas had been

garrisoned by Egyptian troops to protect the pilgrimage routes before
the Firman of 1841 (Mitwali, 1989, p. 46; see Figure 3).

Ali and his

successor, who did not accept the new line, continued to control these
forts along the pilgrims• route for several decades.
The importance of Egypt and its eastern frontier escalated during
the 1850s and 1860s, accompanied with an increasing rivalry between
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France and Great Britain over Egypt.

While the British sponsored the

building of railroads between Alexandria to Suez through Cairo, French
engineers planned to create a canal between the Mediterranean and the
Red Sea for international shipping (Hurewitz, 1989, p. xii).

In 1854,

Ferdinand de Lesseps, a former French consul in Egypt, received
permission from Egyptian Vali/Pasha Said to establish a company to
finance the creation of the Suez Canal (Vatikiotis, 1991, pp 85-88).
During the 1870s the Egyptian economic situation became worse,
arguably due to a combination of corruption, mismanagement, and bad
investments in the canal and other projects.

By 1876, the public debt

had reached £94 million and Egyptian Treasury Bills were suspended.
Britain purchased Egypt's shares in the canal.

Egypt experienced severe

financial distress, and during the year 1880, unrest in the Egyptian
army led to a popular uprising, and Egypt was threatened with a state of
anarchy (Chirol, 1921, p. 38).
The British were concerned about the future of the Suez Canal,
since the shipping route was the lifeline of the British Empire.

This

became especially so after the revolt of Ahmad Urabi, the Egyptian
nationalist officer who opposed the instrusion of foreign powers.
Urabi, a member of a fellah peasant family, served at the Palace of
Cairo in 1863.

He was dismissed by Khedive Ismail for insurgent

activities and became a leading figure in dissent against the Khedive
and his policies.

He utilized dissatisfaction among army.officers to

his advantage and incited the officer corps against Khedive Ismail and
then his son Khedive. Tawfiq.

In 1882, Egypt was in a state of anarchy

and Khedive Tawfiq fled to European protection in Alexandria.

In an
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attempt to resist the nationalist movement, the British sought to
restore the Khedive's authority and to induce reforms (Mansfield, 1972,
pp. 42-50).
In 1882, Great Britain occupied Egypt.

According to Lord Cromer

(1908), the purpose for the occupation was to restore law and order and
to balance the £gyptian budget.

Urabi, who fought against the British,

was defeated and deported from Egypt (p. 328).

Great Britain, which

soon controlled Egypt at all levels except.the lowest, came to face a
growing nationalist movement opposing the occupation.

In the late 1880s

the situation in Egypt was far from Cromer's attitude that the Egyptian
masses were "supposed to be, or at least ought to have been, grateful
for British reforms" (Cromer, 1908, pp. 193-94).

In the mind of Cromer,

the British were there to save Egypt from utter chaos and the ruin of
anarchy, and an uprising was not the proper way for the Egyptian
populace to welcome their British saviors.
The protection of the eastern frontier was one of Lord Cromer's top
priorities because the British were afraid that the Ottomans might try
to exploit the situation and intervene.

During the crisis of 1841,

Britain had supported the Ottoman Sultan in retracting the Egyptian
frontier farther west from Syria because of French influence in Ali's
Egypt. In 1882 the situation was reversed.

Egypt had come under British

occupation, and the British wished to push Egyptian territory farther
east.
In 1892, when Khedive Tawfiq died, Sultan Abdulhamid issued a
Firman of Investiture for the enthronement of Khedive Abbas II Hilmi.
The Firman failed to mention Sinai and the Egyptian forts on the eastern

33
coast of the Red Sea as being subject to the new Khedive (Kishtainy,
1970, p. 17; Hurewitz, 1989, p. xiv).

During the 1880s, the Ottomans

occupied the Egyptian forts on the eastern coast of the Red Sea (see
Figure 3).

By this time, Egyptian and North African Muslim pilgrims had

started to use the Suez Canal as a route to Mecca and no longer needed
protection along the risky overland route.
The Sultan in Istanbul, by his new firman of investiture, tried to
restore his influence in Egypt, the most important province in the
Ottoman Empire, because Egypt was the wealthiest territory in the
region, bringing in the largest revenues and holding a strategic
location on the pilrimage route to Mecca as well as for military
purposes.

He tried to turn the clock back to the line determined in the

Firman of 1841.

According to that boundary, the Ottomans controlled 3-

4 km along the southern end of the canal on the eastern bank (Brawer,
1972, p.S).

The Ottomans valued such a claim along the Suez Canal

because they valued the maritime route for troop movements to guard the
holy places in Mecca and Medina, and for better connection with their
vassal states along the Red Sea coast and in the Gulf.
Lord Cromer, who was carefully watching Ottoman activities
regarding the eastern frontier, protested to Istanbul the omission of
Sinai as a part of the Khedive's governorship.

He delayed the ceremony

of the enthronement of the new Khedive and demanded a new firman.

The

firman crisis was settled by the Grand Vizir (the Ottoman prime
minister), who sent a telegram to the Khedive of Egypt recognizing his
rule ov~r the Sinai peninsula, stating:

"The status quo is maintained

in the same manner as it was administered at the time of your
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grandfather . . . and of your father . .

" (Toye, 1989, p. 59).

Lord

Cromer wrote to Tigrane Pasha, the Egyptian minister of foreign affairs,
accepting the offer as "bounded to the east by a line running in a
southeasterly direction from a point a short distance to the east of ElArish to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, just west of Aqaba itself"
(Toye, 1989, p. 59)(see Figure 2).

Cramer's letter was published in an

official gazette and the Sultan did not formally take objection.

In

view of later developments, it is useful to note that Cramer's
description uses El-Arish, rather than Rafah and Kan Yunis, to mark the
northern terminus of the line.
Meanwhile, the Ottomans annexed Aqaba and the Egyptian forts along
the east coast of the Red Sea to the Vilayet of Al-Hijaz (Kishtainy,
1970, p. 17).

In his memiors, Cromer mentions he believes that the

Sultan's uncertainty and suspicion regarding Je~ish settlement near
Aqaba also underlay the crisis (1908, pp. 268-69).
Although Egypt lost Aqaba and its forts along the pilgrimage route,
for the first time it received Ottoman recognition of an eastern
boundary which included the whole Sinai peninsula.

The British were

satisfied because they had achieved their strategic goal of keeping the
I

Sinai peninsula as a "natural" barrier for the defense of the Suez Canal
(Hurewitz, 1989, p. xvii).

This set the stage for the delimitation of

the Egyptian-Ottoman boundary (Rizik, 1989, p. 46; Brawer, 1972, p. 5).
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CHAPTER 4
THE EGYPT-OTTOMAN BOUNDARY, 1906-1918

The Agaba Incident of 1906
The 1892 description of the frontier between Egypt and the Ottoman
provinces of Syria and Al-Hijaz stood for 14 years.

During this period

the Ottomans remained in silent disagreement with the British over two
critical points regarding the frontier.

First, the fact that the Sinai

peninsula was part of the territory in which the Khedive exercised his
control did not, according to the Ottoman position, make the area an
integral part of Egypt.

The Ottomans considered Sinai separate from the

Egyptian privileged territories described in the investiture Firman of
1892.

Second, the tactical acceptance of the 1892 boundary line by the

Sultan had never been formally recognized by the Ottoman government
(Hurewitz, 1989, xii).
The importance of the Egyptian eastern frontier brought Lord Cromer
to assign Jennings Bramly as British frontier administration officer in
Sinai.

The Egyptian government allocated 5,000 Egyptian pounds in 1905

for the development of Sinai (Mitwali, 1989, p. 71).

Bramly arrived at

en-Nahl 120 km east of the town of Suez, where he established his
headquarters.

Meanwhile, he headed to the frontier area and began

constructing military outposts.

Bramly negotiated with local Turkish

officers over the exact location of the boundary:

he claimed that

Quseima, Kuntilla and the eastern area alongside the Aqaba-Gaza road
were Egyptian territories (Kliot, 1987, p. 55; see Figure 6).

36

i

Mediterranean Sea

N

OTTOMAN
I

I

Bramly "s Proposal

SINAI

EGYPT

EMPIRE

l
Kuntilla •

Gulf of

50 miles

•Sharmi:i esh
Sheikh
Based on: (Brawer, 1970).

Figure 6.

{:.

Red Sea

The Bramly•s Proposal for the Boundary Line, 1906.

37
British activity in the frontier area upset Ottoman authorities in
Istanbul.

When some Egyptian newspapers opposed to the British

occupation exaggerated reports of the frontier issues, the Ottomans
initiated a response.

The Ottoman authorities asked Egypt to withdraw

troops from the frontier, and they ordered the Turkish officer in Aqaba
to establish Ottoman military posts in Quseima and Kuntilla (Mitwali,
1989, p. 72).

In January 1906, Bramly and five Egyptian soldiers

arrived at Umm-Rashrash (the site of the later Israeli Elat), five km
west of Aqaba, and stationed themselves there awaiting additional orders
(see Figure 7).

Rushdi Pasha, the Turkish officer in Aqaba during the

crisis, gave an account of the incident which followed in a detailed
book published in 1910 titled Agaba Affair.

In this book he reveals how

he met with Bramly at Umm-Rashrash and ordered him to vacate the area
because it belonged to the Ottoman Empire.

He s~ggested trying to solve

the problem between Cairo and Istanbul (p. 7).

A few days later Bramly

left Umm-Rashrash for Suez with a letter from the Turkish officer
confirming that Urnrn-Rashrash belonged to the Ottoman administrative
province of Al-Hijaz.
With the absence of Bramly, Rushdi decided to establish a military
post in Umm-Rashrash.

His goal was to prevent further British expansion

and to protect Wadi Araba (which extends from the southern end of the
Dead Sea to Aqaha), especially after Bramly's claim that Wadi Araba
belonged to Egypt (Rushdi, 1910, p. 20).

A wadi is a "desert

watercourse which is usually dry, and contains water only occasionally,
after a heavy rainfall" (Moore, 1974, p. 236).

The term is often used

to refer to the entirety of the depre~sion (i.e. from ridge to ridge)
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carried out by the watercourse.

The wadi can be long enough (here from

the Dead Sea to Aqaba), wide enough, and have ridges high enough to be
important both in transportation and militarily.
In addition to Umm Rashrash, Rushdi occupied Taba with Ottoman
troops.

Taba was then a small village located a few

of Umm-Rashrash on the Red Sea coast.

miles to the south

The Egyptian government sent a

military unit to verify the Ottoman occupation of Taba.

Rushdi refused

to speak with the Egyptian officer regarding the Ottoman presence at
Taba.

On January 22, 1906, an Egyptian naval vessel, Nur al-Bahr,

arrived on the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba near Taba.

Rushdi,

who had approximately 3,000 Ottoman troops stationed in the area,
prepared forcefully to prevent the vessel from anchoring (Rushdi, 1910,
p. 25).

When the Egyptian soldiers tried to reach Taba by boat, the

Ottomans threatened to open fire on them.

The B~itish-Egyptian naval

vessel had no choice but to anchor off Faroun Island, just two miles
from Taba.

There the British captain waited for new orders (see Figure

7).

Bramly was ordered back to the disputed area in an attempt to solve
the problem.

He questioned Sudqi Efendi, the Ottoman officer in Taba,

regarding his prevention of Egyptian troops from landing in Taba.
Bramly threatened, in case of the continuation of the situation, to
bring additional vessels with more troops.

Bramly met also with Rushdi

Pasha, in overall Ottoman command at Aqaba, and demanded the right to
anchor at Taba and to put 50 Egyptian troops ashore in Taba and Aqaba.
Bramly's demands followed the order of the Khedive's government in
Cairo.

In response, Rushdi read the telegram he had received from
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Istanbul.

He was ordered to use all measures necessary to prevent

Egyptian troops from being stationed in Taba (Rushdi, 1910, p. 27).
Meanwhile, the Egyptian troops stationed at Faroun Island awaited
new orders.

The British captain chose Faroun Island for several

reasons:
1.

The island, being only two miles from Taba and several miles

from Aqaba, was a useful site for monitoring Ottoman troop movements in
the area.
2.

The island was uninhabited.

3.

While the British had powerful naval forces, the Ottomans

depended on infantry and had no naval vessels in the Gulf.
4.

The Ottomans had never claimed the island before and the island

was not mentioned in the Firman of 1892 (Mitwali, 1989. p. 74).
In the weeks that followed, diplomatic efforts alternated between
Cairo and Istanbul.

In the frontier area, both sides attempted to avoid

a confrontation between Ottoman and British military.

Bramly asked

Rushdi to inform his government that London was interested in the
demarcation of the boundary by a joint Ottoman-Egyptian commission.

The

Sultan in Istanbul postponed a response to Rushdi's telegram.
Meanwhile, Bramly waited at Faroun Island for a reply from the Turkish
officer.

The simple reason for the delay was the unwillingness of

Istanbul to demarcate a boundary because Egypt was considered to be at
least in the Ottoman sphere of influence even if not a fully subject
part of the Ottoman Empire.

This situation increased the likelihood of

a possible confrontation on the frontier.
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The British, who were determined to restore Taba to Egypt and to
demarcate the boundary, sent additional forces to the area.
British naval vessel, the Diana, arrived at Farun Island.

Another
The British,

who formerly had left formal negotiations to the Khedive and the Sultan,
now officially asked the Sultan to withdraw Ottoman troops from Taha and
to demarcate the boundary.

The Sultan refused, stating that there was

no argument over the boundary (Warburg, 1979, p. 680).

With the arrival

of the Diana, the number of British and Egyptian troops reached 700
(Rushdi, 1910, p. 46).

An angry Ottoman telegram sent to the Khedive on

February 22, 1906, demanded the complete withdrawal of the vessels and
the troops from the area.
The British turned to active diplomacy backed by the threat of
using force.
activity.

The British embassy in Istanbul was the core of this

In addition, the British increased their military forces and

naval vessels in Egypt.

To convince the Ottomans of their

determination, the British enhanced their naval presence in the
Mediterranean Sea.
their position.
Rushdi.

After the British threat, the Ottomans softened

This attitude was obvious in the new orders sent to

He was requested to use all means necessary to prevent a

confrontation with the British.

The Ottomans agreed to send a

delegation to the border to survey the area in order to determine
whether it belonged to Egypt or the Ottomans (Hurewitz, 1989, p. xiii).
The Ottoman officers who were assigned to carry out this mission,
however, postponed their arrival in the border area.

During the second

half of March and into April 1906, the Egyptian authorities tried
unsuccessfully to find the Ottoman delegation.

Rushdi claimed that he
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did not know their whereabouts or their authority.

Meanwhile, Egyptian

authoritities tried to convince Rushdi to leave Taba and refused to
withdraw Egyptian forces from Faroun Island (Rushdi, 1910, p. 62).
The British government became concerned about the behavior of the
Ottoman survey delegation.

The British ambassador in Istanbul protested

and demanded the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Egyptian territories.
The Ottoman response was they would not withdraw until the delegation
made a report.

The British then decided to put more pressure on the

Sultan, informing Istanbul that they were going to send more naval
vessels to Aqaba (Toye, 1989, p. 179).
cooperate with the Egyptians.

The Ottomans then moved to

On April 2, they informed the British

that, according to the delegation's report, the disputed area was
located within Ottoman territories.

They were not willing to negotiate

with Britain over the Egyptian border and instead were only willing to
negotiate with Egypt directly (Toye, 1989, p. 190).
During the month of April, Istanbul and Cairo exchanged many
telegrams regarding the border issue.

The Ottoman position was the

following:
1.

Egypt's eastern border is a straight line from El-Arish to

Suez, according to the Firman of 1841.

The Sinai territories given to

Egypt in 1892 were a trust.
2.

Egypt's population is an integral part of the Ottoman Empire.

3.

The Egyptian military forces are part of the Ottoman forces.

4.

Egypt does not have the right to establish diplomatic ties with

foreign countries.
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5.

Great Britain does not have the right to be in the Taha area.

Only the Egyptian Khedive may be involved in this issue (Mitwali, 1989,
pp. 135-42).
The Egyptian Khedive, backed by Lord Cromer, strongly opposed
Istanbul's position.

He demanded the demarcation of the border

according to the Firman of 1892, and the joint letter of the Grand Vizir
which confirmed that the Egypt-Ottoman boundary was a line extending
from Rafah to Aqaba.

London perceived Istanbul's position as a

violation of the 1892 understanding.

The government decided to put more

pressure on the Ottomans by rallying the European powers and threatening ,
the use of force.
In facing the British threat, the Sultan tended to compromise.
suggested dividing the Sinai peninsula.

He

He offered the Khedive control

of, without claim of privilege, all of Sinai ex~ept the triangular area
located between El-Arish, Suez and Aqaba (see Figure 5).

Egypt refused

to accept the offer and demanded Rafah-Aqaba as a separation line.

The

Sultan of Istanbul proposed an alternative partition which would extend
straight from El-Arish in the north to Ras Muhammad on the southern tip
of the peninsula (see Figure 5).

The fate of the second proposal was as

the first (Heyd, 1963, p. 199; Hurewitz, 1989, p. xv).
Lord Cramer's position was to push the Ottomans to the east as far
as possible.

Both Ottoman suggestions on partitioning the Sinai

peninsula contained a big threat to the Suez Canal.

Cromer believed

that the Germans were encouraging the Ottomans in their confrontation
with the British (Toye, 1989, p. 207).

Ottoman plans to construct a

branch of the Damascus-Al-Hijaz railway to reach Aqaba would not only
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threaten the Suez Canal, but also disrupt possible British construction
of a railway from Cairo to the Persian Gulf via Aqaba (Heyd, 1963, p.
202).
Britain moved to put an end to the tug of war with the Ottoman
Empire after a provocative incident which took place on April 28, 1906,
at Rafah.

An Ottoman army unit occupied Rafah and pulled out two old

telegraph poles which had been emplaced as pillars marking border points
between Egypt and Palestine since 1898.

On May 3 Great Britain,

supported by France and Russia, issued an ultimatum to the Ottoman
Sultan to vacate Taha and agree to the demarcation of the Rafah-Aqaba
line within 10 days.

If the Sultan failed to comply with the demands,

the British government would use force and "the situation will be grave"
(Hurewitz, 1989, p. xvi).

To prove its determination, British naval

vessels were sent to Greek waters at Piraeus and ordered to be ready to
occupy two small Ottoman islands in the Agean sea, Liminos and Mytilene,
and to stop all Ottoman ships in the Mediterranean (Bloomfield, 1957, p.
122).
The Sultan's response after the British actions in the Aegean Sea
was immediate.

He sent a letter to the British ambassador in Istanbul

confirming that the Ottomans would respect the understanding of 1892 and
that they no longer had any claims in the west of the Gulf of Aqaba.
British Ambassador O'Connor responded that the Sultan should take steps
to confirm that by vacating Taha and demarcating the boundary (Toye,
1989, p. 407).

The Sultan suggested a proposal to solve the crisis

containing the following points:
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1.

The British would give recognition to the Sultan's sovereignty

over Egypt.
2.

The Sultan would give confirmation of all the firmans regarding

Egypt.
3.

The Sultan would give agreement to defend Egypt and the Suez

Canal on the side of Britain in the case of threat.
Moreover, Istanbul suggested that both sides vacate the Taha area
and the assign a joint Ottoman-British commission to demarcate the
boundary.

British officials rejected the Sultan's proposal and demanded

unconditional compliance with the British ultimatum (Toye, 1989, pp.
465-66).

Two days before the deadline, the Ottomans agreed to vacate

Taba and to discuss the demarcation of the boundary between Egyptian and
Ottoman officers (Rushdi, 1910, p. 83).
compromise from the Sultan.

Lord Cromer achieved another

While the Firman of 1892 and the letter

from the Grand Vazir mentioned the boundary as a line running from ElArish to Aqaba, the British demanded a line running from Rafah 25 miles
to the east of El-Arish to at least three miles west of Aqaba.

By

agreement, the boundary line was termed a Khat Fasil Idarih, i.e., an
"administrative separating line".
At the end of May, the British-Egyptian delegation to the talks on
the demarcation of the boundary arrived in Aqaba.

Owen, the chief of

security intelligence, and the Egyptian minister, Ibrahim Pasha Fathi,
joined by two British engineers met with the Ottoman representatives,
including two Ottoman officers stationed in the border area, Phahmi
Mohammad and Mozaphar Ahmad.
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The British and Ottoman Suggestions for the Demarcation
The joint commissioners on the boundary demarcation were in
disagreement from the beginning.

Their argument was over the exact

location of the starting point, of the administrative line three miles
west of Aqaba.

While the British-Egyptian delegation demanded measuring

the three miles on the ground, the Ottomans were in favor of more
precise measurement from the air as opposed to less accurate ground
measurements (Rushdi, 1910, p. 103).

Although the joint commission

worked together alongside the border from Aqaba until they _reached
Rafah on June 28, they drew separate lines and came up with conflicting
suggestions.
The Ottomans suggested a line which deviated in order to take into
consideration the Aqaba-Gaza road and centers alongside the road which
should be within Ottoman territories.

They started the administrative

separating line from Ras Taba on the Red Sea coast (i.e. from Taha Cape,
on the Gulf of Aqaba) crossing the top of the hills reaching El-Mafrak,
and from there followed the Aqaba-Gaza road to the top of Ahekiba
mountain where they turned to the northwest to Bir-Ajrod.

The line

continued following the Aqaba-Gaza road until it reached the important
centers of Quseima and El-Muweilih and included them within Ottoman
territories.

It passed El-Rwafah in El-Arish Wadi, following the wadi

until it reached El-Makdabah.

From there the tribal limits of Syarkah

-

and Tarabin served as the line until reaching Rafah (see Figure 8).
The British-Egyptian delegation, joined by two British engineers,
Keeling and Wade, drew a guideline extending straight from Umm-Rashrash
3¾ miles west of Aqaba to Rafah.

Ras en Naqb was the first point it
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reached.

Faced with topographic obstacles, they turned to the northeast

and followed a straight line until they reached Rafah at 29° 36 1 N
latitude and 35° 52' 8

11

E longitude.

The line was straight and deviated

only as the topography dictated in the Jebel Kharuf/Jebel Arif en-Naqa
area and in the Ras en Naqb-Gulf of Aqaba section (Mitwali, 1989, pp.
225-26; see Figure 8).
The two delegations discussed the different proposals but failed to
agree on one line.

Both delegations informed their governments of their

respective lines and arguments.

At this point, the decision became one

to be made at the highest levels.

Both governments reconciled their

differences and on September 13, 1906, sent telegrams regarding their
agreement to the joint commission.

The agreement reached was based on

four principles.
1.

The area along the coast of the gulf b~tween Ras Taba and El-

Mafrak to the east should belong to Aqaba (Ottomans).

El-Mafrak itself

and the area between Ain Kadies and Quseima, including Ain-Gedeirat,
would belong to Sinai (Egypt).

The line between Mafrak and Rafah should

be very close to a straight line, as suggested by the Egyptian
delegation.
2.

Pillars should be constructed along the line by the joint

commission.
3.

The boundary was agreed to be subject to transhurnance.

Bedouin

tribes living on both sides of the line would have the right to make use
of water resources on the western (Egyptian) side of the line; moreover,
Ottoman soldiers and gendarmes could do so as well.
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4.

The Bedouin tribes should continue living on their own lands

and using water sources as before the demarcation (Mitwali, 1989, p.
242).
The joint commission then redrew the line based on the four
principles mentioned above and on October 1, 1906, both parties signed
the agreement.

The Demarcation Agreement of 1906
The demarcation agreement was written in two copies in Turkish, the
official language of communication between Cairo and Istanbul.

In

addition, the two parties agreed to translate the agreement into English
and Arabic.

It should be pointed out that only Turkish copies and the

joint map were signed by both parties.

The agreement was titled,

"Agreement signed and exchanged at Rafah on October 1, 1906, between the
Commissioners of the Turkish Sultanate and Commissioners of the Egyptian
Khedive concerning the fixing of a separate administrative line between
the villayet of Hijaz and Governorate of Jerusalem and the Sinai
peninsula" (Mitwali, 1989, p. 244).
The agreement mentioned in the beginning the names of the
representatives of both parties and their titles.
articles.

It included eight

It will be useful to have the text of the first article.

The Separating
Agreement, begins
GULF OF AQABA and
lying east of and
of JEBEL FORT the
as follows:

Line, as shown on map attached to this
as Ras Taha on the western shore of the
extends to the summit of the mountain
overlooking WADI TABA, and from the summit
Separating Line extends by straight lines

From JEBEL FORT to a point not exceeding two hundred
metres to the east of the summit of JEBEL FATH! PASHA,
thence to that point which is formed by the intersection of
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a prolongation of this line with a perpendicular line drawn
from a point two hundred metres measured from the summit of
JEBEL FATH! PASHA along the line drawn from the centre of
the summit of that hill to MOFRAK POINT (THE mofrak is the
junction of the GAZA-AKABA and NEKHL-AKABA roads). From
this point of intersection to the hill east of and
overlooking THAMILET EL RADADI--place where there is no
water--so that the THAMIIA (or water) remains west of the
LINE, thence to the summit of RAS RADADI marked on the above
mentioned map as A. 3., thence to summit of JEBEL SAFRA
marked as A. 4., thence to summit of eastern peace of UM GUF
marked as A. 5., thence to that point marked as A. 7. north
of THAMILET SUEILMA thence to that point marked as A. 8. on
the west-north-west of JEBEL SUMAUI, thence to summit of
hill west-north-west of BIR MAGHARA (which is the well in
the Northern branch of the WADI MA YEIN, leaving that well
east of the SEPARATING LINE), from thence to A. 9., from
thence to A. 9. bix west of JEBEL MEGRAH, from thence to RAS
EL AIN marked as A. 10. bis, from thence to a point on JEBEL
UM HAWAWIT marked as A. 11., from thence to half distance
between two stone pillars (which pillars are marked as A.
13.) under a tree hundred and ninety metres south-west of
BIR RAFAH, it then runs in a straight line at a bearing-of
280° of the magnetic north (viz., 80° to the west) to a
point on a sand hill measured four hundred and twenty metres
in a straight line from the above mentioned pillars, thence
in a straight line at a bearing of 334° of the magnetic
north (vix., 26° to the west) to the MEDITERRANEAN SEA
12 passsing by hill of ruins on the SEA SHORE. (Mitwali,
1989, pp. 245-246)
Article II described how the line was drawn on the annexed map and
confirmed that both sides had signed the map.
intervisibility between pillars.
were to protect the pillars.

Article III dealt with

Article IV stated that both parties

Article V mentioned that in case a need to

renew the pillars, both parties should send representatives to
accomplish the renewal.

Article VI confirmed that it was the right of

all tribes, Ottoman soldiers, and gendarmes to use the water resources
as it was before the demarcation.

Article VII confirmed the right of

Bedouin tribes to continue to own waterwheels and land as before 1906
(Rizik, 1989, pp. 366-67).
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Demarcation on the Ground
The process of demarcating the line contained two stages:

(a)

surveying the topographical features of the area, and (b) construction
of the pillars.

In the first stage, the joint commission surveyed and

mapped an 8 km strip alongside the line from the Gulf of Aqaba to Rafah
on the Mediterranean Sea.

In addition, they placed guiding stations,

each based on astronomical observations of latitude and longitude.

It

should be pointed out that points 1, 9 and 10, for topographic reasons,
did not keep to the principle of intervisibility, i.e., each pillar
could not be seen from those adjacent to it from both vantage points.
In order to guarantee functional intervisibility, the joint commission
marked 1, 9 and 10 bisects (El-Deeb; 1979, pp. 134-36).

According to

the demarcation, the administrative separation line started on 29° 29
16" N latitude on Ras Taba on the Gulf coast and ended on 31° 17
latitude on the Mediterranean beside Rafah.
follows 34° E longitude.

The line approximately

Its starting point at Taba is 34° 55

its ending point at Taha is 34° 14

20" E.

46" N

9" E and

The 14 stations and their

locations are found on Table 1.
The second stage of the demarcation was the construction of pillars
along the extension of the line.
from Rafah and moved to Taha.

The joint commission started this time

They built telegraph pillars every 1-2.5

km keeping the principle of intervisibility.

The first pillar at Rafah

was marked No. 1 and the last one was No. 91 at the top of Ras Taha.
The base of the pillars stood 2.5 meters high.

Pillars were constructed

in the shape of a pyramid with its top sheared off and with an iron pole
coming out of the top.

The overall placement was in straight lines
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Table 1
Demarcation on the Ground

Latitude North

Longitude East

Point

Location

1

on the Gulf sea shore at Taba

25° 29' 16"

34°

ss•

9"

1 bis.

on Ras Taba

29° 29• 12.4

34°

ss•

5"

2

Alrnafrak

29° 31' 52"

35°

oo•

39"

3

Ras el Raddadi

29° 38· 31"

34° 53, 42"

4

Top of Jabal Safra

290 41' 09"

34° 52' 24"

5

Jabal Om-Guf

29° 45' 29.2"

34° 51' 55"

6

Ras el Geradi

29° 53' 53"

34°

7

on a hill between Thamilat
and Suielma

30° 06· 58"

34° 42• 45"

8

on the top of the hill
northwest of Jabal Sarnawi

30° 22' 14"

34° 37' 02"

9

Jabal Kharuf

30° 29' 39"

34° 33, 48"

9 bis.

Jabal Kharuf

30° 31' 39. 8

10

Ras el Ain/Gederat

30° 39, 03

11

34° 26' 08"

10 bis.
11

Ras el Ain
Jabal Om Hawawit

30° 39, 34"
30° 51' 37"

34° 29' 52"
34° 25' 46"

12

Khashm el-Garn

30° 57' 42"

34° 25' 01"

13

80 meters south of Rafah

31° 17' 46"

34° 14· 20

14

Tal el-Kharayib on the
Mediterranean coast

31° 17' 48.9"

34° 14• 20"

Note.

(El-Deeb, 1979, p. 136).

11

so•

08"

34° 31• 44"
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connecting with each other forming a geometric boundary for the
extension of 210 km (El-Deeb, 1979, pp. 137-38).

It is of unique

interest to note that, in spite of agreements and demarcation, the
memoirs of a former British governor of the Sinai (Jarvis, 1932, end
paper) still show the boundary beginning east of Rafah and ending west
of Taha.

Physical Features of the Boundary Line Area
The boundary line between Egypt and Palestine separated two
geographic units.

Southern Palestine, known as en Naqb (Negev),

occupied 11,700 km2 and the Sinai peninsula composed 60,000 km 2 •

As in

most cases in the Middle East, the boundary line crossed semi-arid and
arid areas.

Scarcity of water is common, and broad-leafed deciduous

shrubs and short grasses form the natural vegetation (Held, 1989, p.
334).
In the northern section of the boundary in the Gaza Strip and
Rafah, the low land that prevails is the sandy coastal plain of the
Mediterranean Sea (see Figure 1).

Southward the elevation increases and

in the Auja area, hills covered with gravel deposits and sand are
common.

Farther south, the area continues to rise and become more rigid

and more sharply sloped.

Elevations reach in some cases 1000 m.

In the

Ras en Naqb and Taba area the precambrian fundament of plutonic and
metamorphic rocks are exposed.

The boundary line ends at Taba on the

Red Sea, which is part of the Rift Valley.
Climatically, the northern section enjoys a Mediterranean type of
climate.

Precipitation ranges between 200-375 mm (8-15 in.) in the Gaza
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Strip.

This amount of rain falls entirely in the winter and supports

agricultural activities mainly of citrus and grains.
the steppe prevails.

S~uthward at Auja,

The amount of precipitation is less.

Farther

south at Taba, the desert climate is common and the area receives less
than 100 mm (4 in.) of precipitation.

Temperatures become very high and

there is a large durinal range of temperature (United States Department
of States, 1961, p. 3).
The population of the area in 1906 was nomadic, moving back and
forth between the two regions, Sinai and en Naqb.

These tribes

concentrated mainly in the center section of the border in the Auja area
and farther north.
maintained.

In the coast area, permanent dwellings were

By 1906, El-Arish, Rafah, and Khan-Yunis were permanent

settlements, as was the older Gaza.
The ultimate establishment of Israel in 1948 would markedly change
the human landscape.

Nomadic movement decreased and Jewish agricultural

settlements were constructed in the frontier.

The administrative line

of 1906 became one separating Egyptians on one side from Israelis on the
other, from a few kilometers south of Rafah to the Gulf of Aqaba.
Factors Related to Demarcation of the Agaba-Rafah Line
The British imposed the Aqaba-Rafah line.
in the Sultan's firmans.
for several reasons:

It was never mentioned

The British perceived this line as the best

(a) politico-geographic, (b) human, and (c)

topographic.
Politico-Geographic Factors
By adopting the Rafah-Aqaba line, Great Britain could exercise
control over the entire Sinai peninsula.

It was the deepest line
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possible Britain could demand from the declining Ottoman Empire at that
time.

This line could protect the Suez Canal better than the former

Ottoman suggestion of El-Arish-Suez, El-Arish-Ras Muhammad or El-ArishAqaba lines.

Moreover, it was the shortest possible line between the

two water bodies, the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba.

From a

military perspective it could be defended easier than the other lines.
The scarcity of population in Sinai made it into a "natural barrier"
(Curzon, 1908, p. 16).

In terms of Sinai, El-Arish was the most

populated town, and it could serve as a strategic base for defense
against possible attack on the Suez Canal.

By depriving them of control

of El-Arish, the Ottomans would have a major obstacle in case of war
against Egypt.
Bramly, the British officer stationed in Sinai who surveyed the
area, had suggested a line which deviated from that which was eventually
accepted in order to follow physical features and the distribution of
Bedouin tribes along the border area (see Figure 6).

His proposal was

rejected for being too long, for giving the Ottomans greater advantages
(such as water resources), and for being too close to El-Arish.

In

addition, Bramly had suggested attaching the southern portion of Wadi
Araba to Egypt.

British policy-makers did not believe that the Ottomans

were willing to compromise so much even if war were threatened (Brawer,
1979, p. 371).
Human Factors
The British planned to command as many resources as possible in the
area.

By depriving the Ottomans of water resources and routes, they

gained defensive advantages.

The British surveyors who studied the
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water resources available on the Sinai peninsula supported the notion of
the Rafah-Aqaba line because this line guaranteed most of the water
resources lay on the Egyptian side.

It is not surprising that the

British, according to the demarcation agreement, granted water for
"Turkish soldiers, native individuals and Gendarmes" by using sources
west of the separating line (Brawer, 1970, p. 7).

It should be pointed

out that the agreement did not include a statement of the right of
Egyptian or British soldiers to acquire water from the east side because
the British knew that there was little left for the Ottomans on that
side, which was extremely poor.
In addition, the Rafah-Aqaba line gave the British and the
Egyptians the major travel routes.

The most important was the Gaza-

Aqaba route.

Most of it ran in the southern section within Egyptian

territories.

Furthermore, the Egyptians commanded the most important

junctions and passes linking Palestine with Egypt.
Naqb, Quseima, and Kuntilla.

These are Ras en

While the British could easily transport

goods and keep solid communications on the western side, the Ottomans
were left in extreme difficulty on their side of the line.
The British, who perceived the Bedouins as a nomadic people,
ignored the fact that the straight line from Aqaba would split tribes
and clans on both sides.

Unlike Bramly, who suggested a line which

considered and safeguarded Bedouin lands and properties, the line
adopted by British policy-makers cut through the lands of three large
tribes in Sinai (Tarabin, Taiyah, and Haiwat) and yet allowed them
travel rights back and forth through the line (Brawer, 1970, p. 8).
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Topographic Factors
According to the agreement signed between the Ottomans and the
Egyptians, the administrative separation line linking the western edge
of Rafah with a point three miles west of Aqaba should be straight.

But

there were two major deviations declared by the topography of the
region, one lying between Jabal Kharuf and Jaba Arif en-Naqa in the midsection of the boundary, and the other one lying in the southern section
between Ras en Naqb and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Jabal Kharuf is a very harsh

and rugged mountain, attaining an elevation of 1080 m. and possessing
very deep and narrow gorges around it.

The deviation of the southern

section was due to high and rugged mountains and deep ravines which
prevent the possibility of drawing a straight line with the principle of
intervisibility of the pillars (Brawer, 1970, p. 107).

It should be

emphasized that the demarcation was carried out in hot and dry weather
and in the process, some mistakes were made.

The British

representatives, who were not accustomed to such conditions, wanted to
complete the work as soon as possible.

One of the most obvious mistakes

was that the last pillar (No. 91) at Ras Taha extended six miles from
Aqaba instead of the three mentioned in the agreement (Brawer, 1970, p.
107-08).
The status of the boundary did not change until 1914 and until then
the frontier area was quiet.

Following the eruption of World War I,

Great Britain separated Egypt from the Ottoman Empire.

It declared

Egypt a protectorate in 1914, deposed Khedive Abbas II Hilmi, and
installed his uncle Husayn Kamil with the new title of Sultan of Egypt
(Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 253).

From that time British maps indicated the

58
separate administrative line of 1906 as an international boundary.

The

Ottomans sided with Germany and Austria-Hungary during the war and
opened a campaign in 1915-16, attempting to capture the waterway of
Suez.

It failed.

The British occupied the Sinai peninsula and Aqaba in

1917.

They expanded farther north which they perceived as deepening the

defense of the Suez Canal.

With the end of the war in November 1918,

Great Britain exercised control over the entire Levant and both sides of
the 1906 boundary.
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CHAPTER 5
THE EGYPT-PALESTINE BOUNDARY, 1918-48

A direct outcome of World War I regarding the Egypt-Palestine
boundary was that it became a boundary within the British Empire.

Since

Great Britain controlled both sides of the boundary, the line might have
lost some of its significance.
still a question.

The issue of sovereignty, however, was

While the status of the territories to the west

(Egypt) was obvious, the status of the eastern side (Palestine) was
still ambiguous.

According to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 between

Great Britain and France, an Arab country should be declared on the east
side of the 1906 boundary line (Goldschmidt, 1983, p. 184).

Moreover,

it should be pointed out that the Balfour Declaration of 1917 did not
mention the subject of boundaries (Goldschmidt, 1983, p. 234).
After the occupation of Palestine at the close of the year 1917,
the British initially moved to establish their control and interests.
At that time Britain was a conqueror, not a mandatory power.

The

Mandate over Palestine would be awarded two years later at the Paris
Peace Conference in 1919.

Proposals for the Boundary Changes Before
the Paris Peace Conference
The question of the viability of the 1906 boundary was discussed
among British officials more intensively during 1918, and after the end
of the First World War different proposals were made.

The common

feeling among the participants in the discussions was that the 1906
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boundary should by changed,

A new factor was involved in the boundary

issue after the Balfour Declaration of 1917:
Organization.

the World Zionist

Except suggestions from Zionists, all other proposals

came from British officers who had been stationed on both sides of the
boundary in Egypt and in Palestine.

Since the status of Palestine was

yet to be determined, British concerns tended to push the boundary
further to the northeast in order to enhance the buffer zone protecting
the Suez Canal.

Two distinct trends in the discussions followed.

The

British officers who had been stationed in Egypt suggested a line
running approximately from Rafah to Beer Sheva to the Dead Sea, and
officers who had served in Palestine proposed a line to the west of the
1906 boundary to be laid along El-Arish Wadi in the northern section of
the 1906 line.

At this same period, the Zionist Movement, which had

earlier demanded the boundary of the Jewish national homeland to run
from Dan (in the north of modern Israel) to Beer Sheva, adopted the
"historical southern limit of Erets Israel" to be along the El-Arish
Wadi (Brawer, 1982, p. 75).
The phrase "Erets Israel" can be translated as "the land of
Israel."

When used by Zionists or Israeli commentators, it can have the

sense of "the rightful homeland of the Jewish people."

When used by

Zionists before 1948, it suggests what territories should be included in
an area where Jews can freely settle or what territories should be
within an independent Jewish state.

When used after 1948, it refers to

the territories Israelis and others who accept the common Zionist view
believe to be historically the Jewish homeland, with or without a
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connotation that such territory should be included, if it is not
presently, within the Israeli state.

The Paris Peace Conference
Before the Paris Peace Conference and following, there was much
disagreement among British policy-makers regarding the boundary.

Arnold

Toynbee, a member of the British political delegation, was nominated to
prepare a complete memorandum on the 1906 boundary line.

The British

political delegation submitted to the conference Toynbee's proposal for
a new boundary extending from a point "5 miles west to Tafila going west
in a straight line.

It meets the 1906 line at Auja and then in a

straight line northwest to El-Arish."

Hogarth, a British officer in

Egypt who was asked to confirm the suggestion instead authored a new
proposal recommending a new boundary line farther north, extended from
"a point on the Mediterranean following Gaza Wadi to a point south of
the Dead Sea and then through Wadi Araba to a a point in the northeast
on the Aqaba Gulf" (Biger, 1981, p. 128) (see Figure 9).

The most

extreme suggestion came from Parker, the governor of Sinai, who
suggested a boundary line beginning farther to the north of what is
today Gaza Strip--and then following Hogarth's line.
Other proposals by British officers and officials stationed in
Egypt were made, but the most well-known was made by General Allenby,
the British Governor of. Egypt, and T.E. Lawrence (the famous Lawrence of
Arabia), a member of the British delegation sent to the Paris Peace
Conference (see Figure 9).

This proposal was to establish a separate

area termed Mandate (C) which was to include the triangular region
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between Rafah-Aqaba-Tafila, because this area was formerly under Ottoman
control and it was felt that this should be placed under the direct
control of the British Empire (Biger, 1981, p. 132).
All proposals were suggested under the uncertainty of a Palestine
Mandate.

There were common agreements regarding the Wadi Araba line

from south to north, but not on the Mediterranean-Dead Sea line from
west to east.

The Zionist delegation, under pressure from the British,

eased its demands.

It should be pointed out that unlike the other

Palestine frontiers, the British Government and the Zionist Movement
were in disagreement regarding an appropriate Egypt-Palestine boundary.
While they held common interests and agreement regarding the boundary in
the north and the east, they were at odds in the south and as a result,
the Zionist delegation never mentioned the exact boundary line they were
demanding at the Peace Conference.

Several months later in the summer

of 1919, Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization,
wrote to Sir Herbert Samuel, British High Commissioner for Palestine,
asking for the Rafah-Aqaba line to include the port of Aqaba itself
(Waingradov, 1965, p. 6).
The British delegation at the Peace Conference proposed one final
line which was close to the first suggestion (see Figure 10).

All

discussions mentioned above had been held in secret within the British
delegation itself, which perceived the issue as a British one.

By the

end of 1919, the British government was certain of the Mandatory power
it would obtain over Palestine.

The Peace Conference convened on April

1, 1919, at San Remo and the European delegations signed an agreement on
the mandates.

At that time the British again began rethinking what
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constituted the boundary of 1906.

Unlike the Palestine border in the

north, British control officially extended on both sides in the south.
The government decided to maintain the 1906 boundary line without any
redefinition of its status (Brawer, 1982, p. 76).
The British decision upholding the 1906 boundary was actually a
compromise between different proposals and political ideologies.
adoption of the 1906 line was temporary.

The

Britain, which apprehended the

boundary as a line within its Empire, did not give publicity to
administrative divisions between Egypt and Palestine.
Although Britain controlled both sides of the boundary line, there
was not any significant joint administration in the area.

After the

conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference, in July 1920 London Government
established a British civil administration in Palestine without
determining Palestinian boundaries.

By October 1920 the civil

administration in Palestine was in charge of the railway system in
Palestine.

However, the railway line which was built during World War I

by the British across the Sinai peninsula between Rafah and Qantara on
the west bank of the Suez Canal was left under the control of the
British military in Egypt (Biger, 1981, p. 134).

Factors Related to the Proposals
Although the boundary line of 1906 failed to change after the Paris
Peace Conference of 1919, the British held serious concerns and
interests regarding the line which led to the different proposals.
These factors can be considered separately:
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Strategic Factors
In the First World War, new weapons were introduced, especially air
forces and large extended-range artillery.

The British wanted to draw a

new line which was defensible and to deepen the distance buffer from the
Suez Canal, taking into account the ability of these new weapons in
striking deep behind enemy lines.

They were also concerned about the

latest advances in capability for mass troop movements.

Most of the

proposals depended on physical features which could serve as obstacles
for crossing and penetration, features which would slow and hinder the
ability of enemy armies from reaching the Canal Zone.
Human Factors
The 1906 administrative line cut through the nomadic lands of
several Bedouin tribes and separated the tribes of Palestine from those
of Sinai.

After the demarcation of 1906, the movement of nomads

continued as before.

The new-proposals considered this factor extremely

important, as had Bramly's proposal in 1906 (see Figure 6).

Some

proposals considered Gaza, Rafah, and Beer Sheva as centers for the
tribes and included them .within Sinai territories.
Economic Factors
The British highly valued the natural resources of the Dead Sea.
They planned to exploit these resources and transfer them overseas via
the Red Sea.

In addition, the Standard Oil Company, an American oil

company which surveyed the Kurnub area southeast of Beer Sheva, planned
drilling there (Biger, 1981, p. 136).

The possibility of cultivating

the land was the main factor in the Zionist Movement's demands for the
area between Rafah and El-Arish.

For the same reason, British officers
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in Egypt rejected the idea because the British wanted to reserve use of
the land for defense and were concerned about surrender_ing it ..
Geopolitical Factors
While the Zionist Movement demanded the inclusion of Aqaba in
Palestinian territories, the British wanted Aqaba as part of Sinai.

The

Zionist Movement wanted to separate Al-Hijaz from Sinai and Egypt, and
the British planned to keep the Gulf of Aqaba under their control, where
they desired to improve port facilities.

When the British were certain

about the Palestinian Mandate, they preferred the bridgehead of the Red
Sea to be in Palestine (Biger, 1981, p. 136).

The Boundary After the Paris Peace Conference
The southern limit of the Sanjak of Jerusalem did not follow the
1906 line in its whole extension as far as the Gulf of Aqaba.

In 1922,

King Abdullah, who was offered the Emirate of Transjordan one year
earlier in the Cairo Conference of 1921, demanded to annex the area to
the south of the former Sanjak of Jerusalem.

But the British chose to

continue their control over southern Palestine too.
Increasing confrontation and unrest in Egypt following the First
World War, especialy during the years 1918 and 1919, convinced the
British that Egyptian nationalism could no longer be suppressed by
military means.
overwhelming.

The demand for independence by Egyptians was
On February 28, 1922, London unilaterially announced the

independence of Egypt.

Sultan Fuad of Egypt became King Fuad I.
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Egyptian independence did not prevent Great Britain from continued
intensive control over Egypt by British advisers (Vatikiotis, 1991, p.
261-264).
Following the Lausanne Treaty of July 1923 and Turkey's declaration
of renunciation of all rights and titles over Egypt, the question of
Egypt's sovereignty over Sinai and its eastern boundary was raised
(Toye, 1989, p. 734).

John Fischer Williams, a legal assessor of the

Sinai Mining Company, raised the question in December 1926, whether
Sinai was Egyptian territory on August 1, 1914, the beginning of World
War I.

The issue was debated on a reparation claim with the British

foreign office.

The official response was "the boundary thus

established [from Rafah to Aqaba] was in effect an administrative
division between two Ottoman provinces" (Toye, 1989, p. 734).

Earlier

in the same year, Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmad Ziwar Pasha wrote to
Lord Lloyd "recognizing the special position of His Majesty's Government
in relation to the territories of Palestine and of Irak," asking if the
eastern Egyptian frontier will be affected by the delimitation of
Palestinian and Iraqi territories.

In response, London assured Egypt

that the Palestine-Egypt frontier "as defined in the year 1906" would
not be affected (Toye, 1989, p. 719).
The question of Egyptian s·overeignty was raised again after the
Second World War.

Bramly, the British Empire's administrative officer

in the Sinai peninsula during the demarcation of the 1906 line, insisted
that the agreement of 1906 between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire failed
to settle the issue of the legality of the eastern Egyptian boundary.
In a letter sent to the foreign office in 1946, he proposed that Britain
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claim the Sinai peninsula for itself by the right of conquest.

Bramly

suggested the establishme.nt of military bases in Sinai (Toye, 1989, p.
743).

During the year 1947, several papers were written supporting and

opposing Bramly's position regarding the status of the Sinai peninsula.
Those in support of Bramly's proposals, argued that Sinai--except for
the northwest corner--was never part of the privileged territories of
Egypt (Recall the Ottoman position in 1906.).

Furthermore, following

the Lausanne Treaty, the Sinai peninsula turned into a "no man's land"
(res nullius) after the renunciation of Turkey's claims and titles over
Egypt.

Those opposed to Bramly's proposals argued that Britain assured

Egypt regarding the status of the boundary in 1926, in Lord Lloyd's
letter reading that the boundary will be "as defined in the year 1906"
(Toye, 1989, p. 219).

In addition, England and Egypt had signed a

Treaty of Alliance in 1936.

Finally, Egypt had received implicit

acceptance of the 1906 boundary from the League of Nations upon joining
in 1937 (Warburg, 1979, pp. 687-89).
From the period 1918-47, and in spite of all attempts to alter the
1906 line, the boundary remained as demarcated in that year.

The

movement of Bedouin tribes crossing that line continued, but was
reduced.

In the 1940s the nomadic people tended to adjust to the new

reality and the line became more of a line of separation than in
previous decades.

During the Second World War, the British neglected

the existence of the boundary and troops, supplies and miscellaneous
equipment crossed as if it did not exist (Brawer, 1982, p. 77).
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CHAPTER 6
THE EGYPT-ISRAEL BOUNDARY I, 1948-67

The modern history of Palestine began with a series of partition
plans.

The confrontations between Arabs and Jews during the British

Mandate and the unbridgeable gap between them led to the formation of
various commissions of inquiry on Palestine.

As early as 1937, the Peel

Commission suggested a division of Palestine into two states, Jewish and
Arab.

The argument over the principle of partition and the allotment of

lands accelerated when the British Government asked, in April 1947, the
United Nations Secretary General to place the problem of Palestine on
the agenda of the United Nations.

London recommended sending another

commission to do an inquiry on the issue.
Though Britain likely preferred specific plans for partition to
others, because of its continuing interests in the Canal and in TransJordan, i.e. for reasons similar to those discussed earlier in reference
to the period 1918-1922, the issue of partition was by 1917 much more
multi-national in scope.

Changes in the status of India (partition and

independence in August 1947) may also have influenced Britain to place
greater responsibility on the United Nations (Lloyd, 1984, p. 328).

The

question of to what extent Britain expected to retain its authority
within Egypt under the treaty of 1936 (Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 322) or in
Trans-Jordan is important in the history of the region that is separate
from the issues considered here.

In fact, the British announced an

intention of withdrawing and accepted United Nations involvement in
partition.
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The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP), after
investigation, recommended the partitioning of Palestine.

On November

29, 1947, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on the
partitioning of Palestine.

Arabs, mainly the Egyptian and Trans-

Jordanian Governments and the Arab people of the former Palestine
Mandate, rejected the resolution on the basis of principle (Goldschmidt,
1983, p. 224).

They claimed that the United Nations did not have the

jurisdiction to partition countries and demanded that the issue be
referred to the International Court of Justice.
The various proposals for partitioning Palestine referred to the
Egypt-Palestine boundary as an international one.

All the proposals

concerned territory east of the Rafah-Aqaba line.

The question was over

which country was going to share the boundary with Egypt.

While

according to the Peel Plan of 1937 only the Arab state would share the
border with Egypt, the United Nations Partition Plan allowed both newly
proposed states to share portions of this line (Hadawi, 1959, p. 41;
Gilbert, 1974, p. 38).

The Rafah-Aqaba line, which extends for 210 km,

was proposed to be allocated between the two parties.

The portion of

the line extending 110 km from the area of Rafah in the northern section
to Auja and further to the southeast was to belong the the Arab State,
while the remaining 100 km in the southern section was proposed to be
given to the Jewish State

(see Figure 11).

The partition plan of November 29, 1947, failed to end the
hostilities between Arabs and Jews.

Well-trained and equipped Jewish

soldiers led by the Haganah, the Jewish Army, were highly successful in
battle.

By May 15, 1948, the Israelis had occupied portions of the
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territories allocated to an Arab State.

The British Mandate

authorities, who were supposed to withdraw by August 1948 according to
the Partition Resolution of 1947, announced their desire to terminate
the Mandate on the 15th of May after Israel declared its independence on
the 14th.
states.

The Palestinian Arab High Committee appealed to the Arab
They declared their willingness to take measures to prevent the

establishment of the Jewish State.
entered Palestine.

On May 15th, 1948, joint Arab armies

The Egyptian forces penetrated the Rafah-Aqaba line.

By June of 1948, southern Palestine was under the control of the
Egyptian forces, especially along coastal areas including Ashqelon and
Ashdod.

They reached a point 30 km south of Tel-Aviv (El-Sayid, 1985,

p. 28).
During the period of the fighting between May 1948 and January
1949, the UN Security Council issued eight cease fire resolutions which
were violated by both parties.

While the first truce of May 29 was

violated by Egypt, the second truce of July 18 was violated by Israel.
By initiating Operation Horev on December 22, 1948, the Israelis occuped
the southwest section of Palestine, capturing Auja and advancing into
Sinai.

Their raids reached Bir Hasna and Bir Hama in the heart of

Sinai, and only the cease fire saved El-Arish from coming under
occupation (see Figure 12) (Lorch, 1961, p. 490).
There was a strategic reason behind Operation Horev and the
penetration of the Rafah-Aqaba line into Sinai.

The existence of Israel

as a new state was accepted by the world's most powerful countries, but
its boundaries were not.

Israel, which proclaimed its independence on

May 15, 1948, did not define its boundaries.

The southern section of
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Palestine, en Naqb, was disputed.
interested in that area.

The British Government was still

Israel attempted to gain complete control over

southern Palestine after a suggestion was made by the UN mediatior, Dr.
Ralph Bunche, to exchange southern Palestine (en Naqb) with the northern
area of Galilee as part of the new Arab State.
occupied by Israel (Lorch, 1961, p. 491).

Galilee was already

Britain, watching the theater

carefully, demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian
territories behind the Rafah-Aqaba line and threatened to intervene and
expel the Israelis from Sinai under the title of the Anglo-Egyptian
Treaty of 1936.

During Operation Horev the Israelis shot down a British

airplane which circled over the battlefield area, killing five British
soldiers.

In response, the British strengthened their garrison at Aqaba

(Lorch, 1961, p. 525).
By January 6, 1949, Egypt accepted the cease fire and entered into
negotiations with the Israelis.

Egypt was still holding some positions

in southern Palestine (Lorch, 1961, p. 525).

The Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement of 1949
The Armistice negotiations between Israel and Egypt started on
January 13, 1949, in the Hotel of Roses on Rhodes in the Mediterranean.
The Egyptian delegation demanded immediate Israeli withdrawal from
positions captured after the UN Security Council Resolution of November
4.

They meant for Israel to abandon positons captured in Operations

Yoav and Horev (Lorch, 1961, p. 535).

The Israelis insisted upon

Egyptian forces withdrawing from all territories within the former
Palestine Mandate.

As a starting point, UN mediator Bunche convinced
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both delegations not to renew hostilities.

The first crisis in the

negotations was over the Faluja (an area 40 km east of Ashqelop on the
way to Beer Sheva).

The Egyptians and the Israelis were in disagreement

over the evacuation of a besieged brigade of Egyptian forces, which
contained a third of their forces in Palestine, from Faluja.

One of the

commanders of this army was Gamal Abd El-Nasser, who three years later
became the leading officer in the Egyptian Revolution and then President
of Egypt.

The Israelis exploited the isolation of the Egyptian forces

at Faluja as a bargaining chip.
The defeated Egyptian Army agreed to most of the Israeli demands
and an Armistice demarcation agreement was signed on February 24, 1949,
under the auspices of the United Nations.

According to the terms of the

agreement, Egypt exercised control over what became the "Gaza Strip,"
and a demilitarized zone around Auja was established.

Later, on

February 22, 1950, a modus vivendi to the General Armistice Agreement
cleared up the armistice line by delimiting the Gaza Strip within the
Armistice Agreement of 1949 (The Geographer, 1961, p. 2).
The Armistice line of 1949 between Israel and Egypt follows the
Egypt-Palestine line of 1906.

It extended between the Gulf of Aqaba and

the Gaza Strip, just 8 miles from the Mediterranean Sea (see Figure 13).
The demarcation was based on Article I of the Egypt-Ottoman agreement of
1906, which explained the Rafah-Aqaba line in detail.

The status of the

Armistice line was clarified in Paragraph II of Article V.
The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any
sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is
delineated without prejudice to the rights, claims and
positions of either party to the Armistice as regards
ultimate settlement of the Palestinian question. (United
Nations, 1949, p. 256)
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The Demilitarized Zone
The first paragraph of Article VIII stated the following.
The area comprising the village of El-Auwja and vicinity, as
defined in Paragraph 2 of this Article, shall be
demilitarized, and both Egyptian and Israeli armed forces
shall be totally excluded therefrom. The chairman of the
Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article X of this
Agreement and United Nations Observers attached to the
commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full
implimentation of this provision.
Paragraph 2 added the following:
The area thus demilitarized shall be as follows: From a
point on the Egypt-Palestine frontier five (5).kilometers
north-west of the intersection of Rafah-El-Auwja road (MR
08750468), south-east to Khashm El-Mamdud (MR 09650414)
thence south-east to Hill 405 (MR 10780285), thence southwest to a point on the Egyptian-Palestine frontier five· (5)
kilometers south-east of the intersection of the old railway
tracks and the frontier (MR 09950145), thence returning
north-west along the Egypt-Palestine frontier to the point
of Origin. (United Nations, 1949, pp. 261-62) (see Figure
14) 2
Auja is an Arab village located in the central section of the
Egypt-Palestine boundary just three km from the boundary line.

The area

of Auja has two main advantages which caused heated arguments during the
negotiations of the Armistice Agreement.

First, the topographic

features of the area include a hill which gives the party in control of
it strategic advantage.

From Auja, conceivably, the dominance of the

Sinai desert and the en Naqb Desert is possible.

Second, the area

contains the strategic crossroads from Beer Sheva to Cairo. and Gaza to

2

MR denotes "Map Reference."
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Aqaba.

Moreoever, this crossroads was a_ station on the pilgrims route

to Mecca (Al Mawsoah al-Phalastinia, 1984, p. 358; Alexander, 1954, p.
325).
The importance of the area led to a crisis during the Armistice
negotiations.

Egypt claimed that the area was supposed to be allocated

to the Arab State according to the Partition Plan, and Israel, which
exercised military occupation over the area, refused to withdraw its
claims over the highly valued area.
Israel, which realized the determination of the Egyptians not to
sign the agreement without Auja, agreed to the demilitarization. The
sovereignty of the area was ambiguous.

In response, Israel demanded and

achieved the demilitarization of the area facing Auja in the Egyptian
section.

The Egyptian delegation agreed for Quseima and Abu-Aweiqila,

26 km farther west in Sinai desert, to be areas without defensive
positions (El-Sayid, 1985, p. 55).
Israel, which realized the importance of the Auja area for military
purposes in the First World War, moved to occupy the demilitarized zone.
The President of the joint commission for the demilitarized zone
informed the UN Security Council on September 21, 1955, that Zahal (the
Israeli Defense Forces) had occupied the area.

One year later the joint

commission was prevented from holding its meeting at its headquarters in
the village of Auja.

In October 1956, Israel launched a major assult on

Egyptian forces from Auja (Higgins, 1969, p. 108).
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The Gaza Strip
On the eve of the beginning of the Armistice Agreement between
Egypt and Israel in February 1949, the Egyptian forces were stationed in
the Gaza area.

Moreover, this area was crowded by native Palestinian

Arabs and by Arab refugees from areas which had been allocated according
to the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947 to the Arab State.

Under

the Armistice Agreement, Egypt exercised control over the area defined
as the Gaza Strip.
The Gaza Strip came into existence only after the conclusion of the
1949 Armistice demarcation line.

The limit of the strip followed the

cease fire lines between the Israeli forces and the joint EgyptianPalestinian forces.

Paragraph 1, Article VI of the General Armistice

Agreeement stated the following.
In the Gaza-Rafah area the Armistice Demarcation Line shall
be as delineated in Paragraph 2.B(i) of the Memorandum of 13
November 1948 on the implimentation of the Security Council
Resolution of 4 November 1948, namely by a line from the
coast at the mouth of the Wadi Hasi in an easterly direction
through Deir Suneid and across the Gaza-Al Majdal Highway to
a point 3 kilometres east of the highway, then in a
southerly direction parallel to the Gaza-Al Majdal Highway,
and continuing thus to the Egyptian frontier. (United
Nations, 1949, p. 258)
Gaza Strip covers 360 km2 (139 mi 2 ) of territory.

It extends for a

length of 45 km (28 miles) from northeast to southeast with an average
width of 7 km (4.5 miles) facing the Mediterranean Sea on the west end
of the Egypt-Palestine boundary line in the south and the demarcation
line in the north of Gaza just 7 km (4.35 miles) to the north of the
city (see Figure 15).

On February 22, 1950, one year after the signing

of the Demarcation Agreement, a modus vivendi to the General Armistice
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altered and limited the northern and eastern parts of the Gaza Strip
demarcation line.

Paragraph 1, Article I of the Modus Vivendi is the

following.
(a) the "A" Zone is delineated as follows: It is the Zone
between the demearcation line and a line from M.R. 1017011160 in a straight line to point M.R. 10690-10740 at the
railway crossing and then in a stright line to point M.R.
10795-10640, to point 72,9 M.R. 10900-10565, to point 82,2
M.R. 10 9180-10410 and then to the demarcation line at point
95,1 M.R. 10695-10240 (all points inclusive to Egyptian
side).
(b) the "B" Zone is delineated as follows: It is the Zone
between the line delineated in paragraph (a) above and the
Egyptian fighting line north of Beit Labia.
(c) the "C"
between the
08935-08590
07970, M.R.
demarcation
to Egyptian
1961, p. 5)

Zone is delineated as follows: It is the Zone
demarcation line and a line from point M.R.
in a straight line to point 76,6 M.R. 09035~
08970-07790 and from this point to the
line at M.R. 08735-07670 (all points inclusive
side). (United States Department of States,
(see Figure 10)
Southern Palestine

During the 1948 War and the beginning of 1949, Israel gained
control over most of the area of southern Palestine (en Naqb).

Israeli

forces reached Ein Hosb by Operation Lot, and Auja by Operation Horev
(Lorch, 1961, p. 537).

Yet a large triangle between these two locations

and the Gulf of Aqaba, which was bounded by the 1906 Egyptian boundary
in the west and El-Araba in the east, remained (see Figure 16).

Most of

the southern part of Palestine was allocated, according to the Partition
Plan, to the Jewish State.

During the Armistice negotiations, Egypt

removed its claims over the area.

Transjordan, which had some of its

military units locked up in the harsh, rugged, and unpopulated area,
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claimed it; Transjordan exercised military control there when the cease
fire began (Lorch, 1961, p. 537).
Israel, which signed the Armistice Agreement with Egypt in February
of 1949 and began negotiations with Transjordan on March 1, launched on
March 5 the final military operation to conquer the southern tip of
Palestine.

The Israeli forces penetrated the Jordanian truce lines on

March 7 and reached the Gulf of Aqaba on March 11 (Lorch, 1961, p. 537).
Now Israel controlled the whole eastern side of Rafah-Aqaba line of
The Partition Plan apportioned 56 percent or 15,850 km2 of the

1906.

total territory of Palestine for the Jewish State.
this area was in the southern part of Palestine.

Over 9,500 km2 of
After the 1948-49 War

and the conclusion of the Armistice Agreements, the Jewish State held
20,770 km2 of territory, of which the southern portion comprised around
13,000 km2 of the total area (Kliot, 1987, p. 61).

The Egypt-Israel Boundary, 1950-56
As soon as the Armistice agreement was concluded and signed, Egypt
and Israel were in disagreement over its interpretation.

Moveover,

incidents which took place along the border accelerated tensions in the
area.

During the summer of 1950 Israeli authorities expelled an

estimated 6,000-7,000 Bedouins belonging to the Azazme tribe from the
demilitarized zone and other areas to Sinai across the international
border.

Others were deported by Egypt back to Israel from Sinai.

Furthermore, about 2,000 Palestinians were expelled from El-Majdal

(which became Ashqelon after 1948) to the Gaza Strip.

Egypt complained
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to the Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) which decided that "these Arabs
be repatriated to the Israeli-controlled area" (Higgins, 1969, p. 147).
The refugee problem caused considerable trouble along the border
area.

Many Palestinians had been begun crossing the border back to

their properties inside Palestine.

The early crossings and incidents

along the border originated from innocent motives.

Confirmation of the

right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland by the United
Nations General Assembly in December 1948 increased the number of
crossings to Israel.

Moreover, some crossings were accidental because

the demarcation line was no longer clear in some areas.

Israel claimed

the crossings were for theft and smuggling and deaths resulted when
crossers where shot (Khouri, 1968, pp. 183-84).
The question of the demilitarized zone was one of the issues most
affecting the border area and the Demarcation Line Agreement.

The

Israeli Government exploited the ambiguous paragraph in the agreement
regarding the DMZ and moved to take it over.

As early as September

1953, Israel established Kibbutz Qetsiot within the demilitarized area.
The settlement expanded to establish other kibbutzes in that area.
Moreover, Israel decided to confine the movement of the United Nations
observers in the demilitarized z~ne.

Later, Israel refused any entree

to Auja to the Egyptian members of the MAC.

The commission was not

allowed to meet in its headquarters in Auja so it did not fully function
after October 1951.

In September 1956, Israeli Prime Minister David

Ben-Gurion stated:

"No meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission at

Auja should be allowed" (Higgins, 1969, p. 156).

The justification

presented was "Egypt's non-compliance with Article I and the security
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council resolution of 1st September 1951 concerning interference with
the passage through the Suez Canal of shipping bound for Israel"
(Higgins, 1969, pp. 156-57).
The controversy over the right of Israeli passage through the Suez
Canal directly affected the behavior of the two parties along the
border.

Israel insisted on Article I of the Armistice Agreement

reading, "No agressive action by the armed forces--land, sea, or air of
either party shall be undertaken, planned . . . . The establishment of an
armistice between the armed forces of the two parties is accepted as an
indispensible step towards the liquidation of armed conflict and the
restoration of peace in Palestine" (United Nations, 1949, p. 254).
Egypt argued the military meaning of the agreement and referred to
Article V of the Agreement stating, "The Armistice Demarcation Line is
not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary,
and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of
either party to the Armistice . . . " (United Nations, 1949, p.256).
Egypt, which initiated an economic boycott against Israel in 1948,
started searching for and in some cases confiscating goods and items
shipped to Israel through the Suez Canal.
not allowed to pass through the canal.

Moreover, Israeli ships were

Egypt justified its measures

claiming that a state of war still existed with Israel, and that Egypt
had these reduced rights of belligerence.

Israel emphasized that the

United Nations Charter prevented members from using the rights of
belligerence against other members, pointing to the intent of the
Armistice Agreement.

As early as 1949 Israel complained to the MAC
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regarding Egypt's action.

In September 1951, the Security Council

passed a resolution in favor of the Israeli position (Khouri, 1968, pp.
205-06).
The incidents along the border area between Egypt and Israel,
mainly along the Gaza Strip front, intensified in late 1954 and during
1955.

Arabs tended to sabotage settlements which Israel constructed and

fortified very close to the demarcation line and Israel retaliated and
in some cases initiated actions behind the border.

In February 1955,

Israel attacked the town of Beit-Hannun in the northern section of Gaza
Strip, resulting in at least 39 deaths.

Egypt retaliated in August 1955

by establishing the Fedayeen group which took action and raided the
Israeli frontier settlements, again resulting in deaths.

The raids and

counter-raids continued, leaving both sides with hundreds of casualites,
mostly civilian.

An Israeli writer suggested in 1955:

There is a feeling in Israel that the only way to get the
reluctant Arabs to the peace table is to make the armistice
situation disadvantageous to them . . . Those bloody "border
incidents" are seldom accidental. . . They are part
retaliation, part a deliberate plan to force the Arabs to
the peace table. Some call it "realistic," others
"cynical"--but it promises to be effective. (Brilliant,
1955, pp. 68-9)
Besides the local clashes along the border, regional and
international actions hastened the confrontation of 1956 between Israel,
Britain and France on one side, and Egypt on the other.

The behavior of

Nasser, the Egyptian president, and his policy were the core of these
actions.

Nasser's buying weaponry from communist countries, his

formation of diplomatic relations with China and his non-aliens policy
caused him to be perceived with intransigence in western eyes
(Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 391).

Because the U.S. administration was
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displeased with Nasser's actions, it suspended the American offer to
help construct the High Dam at Aswan.
dramatic.

Nasser's retaliation was

He announced on July 26, 1956 the nationalization of the Suez

Canal Company.

Western countries condemned Nasser's action.

While the

Americans supported a diplomatic solution, France and Britain demanded
military action to restore their rights in the Canal Zone.

France and

Britain likely wished to remove Nasser, who was accused by France of
supporting the Algerian rebellion.

Britain, after the formation of the

Bagdad Pact of 1955, apprehended Nasser as a threat to the peace and
stability of the region (Vatikiotis, 1991, pp. 390-393).
Israel was a major beneficiary of the new situation.

Strong anti-

Nasser sentiment after the nationalization of the Suez Canal encouraged
Israel to invade Egypt.

The goal of the destruction of the Fedayeen

bases in Egyptian territories and in the Gaza ~trip encouraged Israel to
act.

Moreover, opening the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba for Israeli

shipping and forcing Egypt to abolish the Arab boycott against Israel
were important reasons behind the invasion (Khouri, 1968, p. 214).

By

the end of October, Israel, Britain and France were in a common
agreement regarding the Suez Canal crisis and the actions which should
be taken to end it.
Israel penetrated the Egyptian lines on October 29, 1955, and
approached a line just 10 km east of the Suez Canal in two days (see
Figure 17).

Earlier, it declared its suspension and denunciation of the

Armistice Agreement (Higgins, 1969, p. 109).

On October 31 the French

and British forces, which were stationed in the Mediterranean Sea and on
Cyprus, bombed Egyptian airports and landed at several places in the
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Canal Zone.

By November 6 the French and British forces occupied Port

Said, the Egyptian city at the mouth of the canal.

On the same day,

Soviet Prime Minister Alexander Polganin issued two ultimata to Israel,
Britain, and France to stop the fighting and to withdraw from Egyptian
territories.

Moreover, the U.S. administration announced its opposition

to the invasion and initiated a UN Security Council meeting calling for
an "immediate cease fire" and "prompt withdrawal" of Israel forces.
France and Britain accepted a cease fire on November 6 and Israel on
November 8 (Khouri, 1968, p. 217).

While France and Britain withdrew

immediately, Israel completed its withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza Strip
by March 8, 1957.

The Egypt-Israel Boundary, 1957-67
As one outcome of the 1956 War, the United Nations Emergency Forces
(UNEF) was established.

These forces were stationed along the

demarcation line in the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian side of the
demarcation line and in Sharm esh-Sheikh (see Figure 18).

Israel

refused to accept UNEF forces on its side (Higgins, 1969, p. 335).

The

rules of the peacekeeping forces were to monitor the withdrawal of
forces and to guarantee free navigation and compliance with UN
resolutions.

The Gulf of Aqaba opened for Israeli ships.

Egypt

continued to close the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping.
During 1957-59, Egypt permitted the passage of foreign ships to
Israeli ports but after that restored the restrictions, stopping ships
and checking and confiscating certain types of cargo bound for Israel.
It began to search for and confiscate Israeli-owned commodities.

The
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situation along the Armistice Demarcation Line was quiet for a few
years, but in the first half of the 1960s incidents took place along the
border mainly as air violations.

According to UNEF Report 667,

incidents took place during 1961-62 and according to Reports 669, 630,
664, in the following three years (Higgins, 1969, p. 335).

However,

they were minor compared with other incidents along the Israel-Jordan
and Israel-Syria lines.
Tensions between Syria and Israel in 1965-67, in part over the
diversion of Jordan River waters, led to military cooperation between
Syria and Egypt.
with Israel.

The Nasser government moved into the frontier area

Nasser's aim was apparently to assure the Israeli

Government of his willingness to interfere in favor of Syria if the
former was attacked by Israel.
on May 15, 1967.
UNEF forces.

The Egyptian military movement started

Egypt requested on the following day the withdrawal of

U-Thant, the United Nations Secretary General, ordered the

evacuation on May 19 (El-Sayid, 1985, p. 152).
Straits of Tiran on May 23 (see Figure 17).

Egypt blockaded the

Israel perceived the latter

Egyptian action as a casus belli.

The Israeli Government's Perspective on
the Boundary, 1948-67
Territorial and border issues concerning Palestine were of great
import to Zionists before 1948, and they have remained important in the
Israeli Government since the

establishment of the Jewish State.

On the

eve of the proclamation of Israel, on May 14, 1948, and prior to the
Arab invasion, Zionist decision-makers opposed the boundaries of the
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Partition Plan, and these boundaries were not included in the Israeli
Independence Convention.

David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime

minister, stated that the Yishoav, the Jewish community in Palestine,
should oppose the territorial partition of the UN.

He believed that the

UN partition proposal was harmful in terms of military matters and the
future protection of a Jewish State (Bar-Zohar, 1978, pp. 500-01).
On June 14, 1948, the Israeli Government held the first discussion
regarding the boundaries of Israel.

The dominant proposal was that

Israel should exercise permanent control over the territories allotted
for the Arab State and occupied by Jewish troops, in addition to the
control ~f territories allocated to the Jewish State in the United
Nations partition plan of 1947.

The Israeli Government accepted the

recommendations of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion not to make any decision
while the military situation was still fragile, so the first decision
regarding the boundary issue taken by the Israeli Government was to wait
and not to decide.

Two weeks later, on July 2, the Israeli Government

decided to include the occupied territories allocated for an Arab State
within its control.

Israel did not accept the United Nations

resolutions calling for withdrawal from those territories.

During 1949,

Israel signed armistice agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and
Syria (Rawder, 1980, p. 280).
The Demarcation Line System between Israel and Egypt collapsed in
October 1956 when Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the Sinai
peninsula.

Earlier and since March 1955, Israel had adopted a new

territorial doctrine.

While between the years 1949-54 Israel tended to

accept the Armistice Demarcation Line as the permanent boundary line
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between Israel and Egypt, in 1955 it demanded changes in the boundary
line.

Ben-Gurion, returned to service in the Israeli Government as

Defense Minister and supported by Moishe Dyan, the Israeli Chief of
Staff, initiated a plan in April 1955 to occupy the Gaza Strip and the
western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba.

He sought to eliminate the raids on

Israel which were coming from the Gaza Strip and to open the straits of
Tiran to Israeli vessels for free passage.

Ben-Gurion considered the

annexation of the Gaza Strip to Israel and the deportation of the
population to Egypt and Jordan as a possible permanent solution to
terrorist actions and raids (Rawder, 1980, pp. 334-35).

Six months

later, he' gave publicity to his thoughts in an interview with a New York
Times journalist on September 27, 1955.

But only on October 28, 1956,

did the Israeli Government pass his plan.
Ben-Gurion was used to making decisions without bothering with
consulting others.

In a speech given by him on July 11, 1956, in the

Knesset (the Israeli Parliament), he explained that the goal of the 1956
Israeli attack on Gaza Strip was "to free the homeland from the Egyptian
invader," and added "The Sinai Desert never was an Egyptian territory."
One day before, on November 5, 1956, he spoke in front of Israeli
soldiers at Sharm esh-Sheikh proclaiming the creation of the third
Israeli Kingdom (Rawder, 1980, p. 341).
The international condemnation of the joint British-French-Israeli
invasion of Egypt pressured Ben-Gurion and the Israeli Government to
agree to withdraw from Sinai and the Gaza Strip.

Ben-Gurion continued

to look at the possibility of making arrangements with Egypt for Israeli
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navigation through the Suez Canal and finding better solutions to
protect Israel from the raids coming from Gaza.

Social Consequences of the Egypt-Israel
Boundary, 1949-67
The creation of the State of Israel drastically altered the
uneventful nature of the boundary of 1906.
Jewish settlement.

It was an antecedent to

In the early 1950s and during the year 1967

following Jewish immigration to Israel, the Israeli Government built
tens of settlments in the frontier.
branch of the Israeli Defense Forces.

Nahal (National Pioneer Youth) is a
Israeli youth belonging to this

group do agricultural work near their settlements and sometimes engage
in military activities (Gilbert, 1974, p. 59).

In the early 1950s

nomadic movement across the line was totally stopped.

The Bedouin

tribes in the border area either moved to Egypt or were deported by
Israel, small portions of them being transferred to the Beer Sheva area
farther north from the boundary.
ethnic separation line:

Again, the sealed boundary became an

the Arab population (Egyptian and Palestinian)

on one side, and the Jewish population on the other to the north
(Brawer, 1979, p. 374).
In addition, the landscape along the-boundary area drastically
changed.

On the Israeli side, even with the very limited water

resources the Ottomans have been reluctant to accept in 1906, grasses
and trees could be grown without any threat of consumption by Bedouin
animals, while .on the other side the animals continued to eliminate the
grasses and scattered trees in the area.
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CHAPTER 7
THE EGYPT-ISRAEL BOUNDARY II, 1967-78

The June War of 1967
Early in the. morning on Tuesday, June 5, 1967, the Israeli air
force severely damaged most military airfields throughout Egypt,
reaching south to the Sudanese border area.

This operation was followed

by a large scale penetration of the boundary between the two countries
by armored Israeli infantry.

A few days later Israel and Egypt agreed

on a new cease fire line (see Figure 19).

The Suez Canal, the use

ofwhich was one of the main factors behind the 1967 War, became the
separation line between the two parties.

The canal was closed to

international navigation due both to geo-political circumstances and
wreckage, and it remained closed until 1975 (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p.
289).
The immediate outcome of the 1967 War along the Egyptian frontier
was that Israel suddenly controlled as much as three times its previous
land area.

An irony was that its effective border with Egypt was

shortened from 242 km to 168 km along the Suez Canal.

Control of the

Sinai peninsula gave Israel a great strategic advantage.

The 60,000 km2

area contains Sharm esh-Sheikh near its southern tip, the entrance to
the Gulf of Aqaba leading to the Israeli port city of Elat.
it gave Israel strategic depth in a shorter border.

Moreover,

A few years later

it was obvious that the area held promises for economic development
(Drysdale & Blake, 1985, pp. 291-292).
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Between 1967-78 Israel invested heavily in the area, militarily and
otherwise, exploiting the economic resources of Sinai and the Gaza Stip
and integrating them into the Israeli national economic system.
Agricultural settlements were built, especially in the area between
Rafah and El-Arish.

Israel's Security and the Boundary Issue
Formulating a peaceful settlement between two members of the
international community following a war is presumed to be u_nder the
jurisdiction of international law.

In this case, following the June War

of 1967 and the occupation of Sinai and the Gaza Strip on the Egyptian
front and other Arab territories on other routes, the United Nations
Security Council adopted Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967.

The

Resolution required both "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent conflict" (Perry, 1977, pp. 416417), and:
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and
respect for and acknowledgement of sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of every state in the
area and their right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threat or acts of force.
(Blum, 1971, pp. 119-20)
The Resolution became the blueprint for any possible settlement between
Israel and Egypt and the other Arab neighboring states involved in the
1967 confrontation.
From its establishment in 1948 up to the occupations of 1967,
Israel expressed dissatisfaction with its security and the vulnerability
of its borders.

Following the adoption of UN Resolution 242, Israeli

officials insisted in their demands on "secure and recognized
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boundar[ies]," hinting at possible changes in the armistice lines with
the Arab countries.
Yehuda Blum, the former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations,
argued that the Armistice Demarcation Line with Egypt was neither
"boundaries" nor "secure" nor "recognized."

He added that Israel could

not tolerate Egyptian air forces just five minutes flying time from the
center of industry and population of the state.

Moreover, it was

unacceptable that Israel had only five miles outlet on the Red Sea
between the Jordanian and Egyptian boundary lines (Blum, 1971, pp. 72-

75).
A variety of interpretations of UN Resolution 242 regarding the
"withdrawal clause" still exist today after the final withdrawal from
Sinai Peninsula.

While the Israelis insist on the English version of

Article I of the Resolution which reads, "Withdrawal of Israeli forces
from territories occupied in the recent conflict," the Arabs interpret
this Article as meaning a complete withdrawal, maintaining the French
version of the Resolution (the other UN working language at that debate
when the Malian representative was the President of the UN Security
Council and spoke in French).

This version is interpreted to call for

withdrawal from all occupied territories.

The French version reads,

"Retrait des forces armees israelienns des territories occupes lors du
recent conflict," adding that the other versions in UN languages
(Spanish, Russian, and possibly Chinese) called for total withdrawal
from the occupied territories.

Moreover, the resolution emphasized "the

inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war."

For the Arab
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states, the omission of the definite article does not necessarily
distort the meaning of the resolution (Perry, 1977, p. 417).
Israel does not accept the requirement of total withdrawal from
occupied territories.

It underlines the acceptance of the UN Security

Council, in Resolution 242, that every state has the "right to live in
peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts
of force," and as Article II paragraph 3 of the Resolution affirms, "the
necessity for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political
independence of every state in the area, through measures i_ncluding the
establishment of demilitarized zones" (Blum, 1971, pp. 119-20).
The very slow pace of political activities following the June 1967
War and the unwillingness of Israel to comply with UN Resolution 242 led
to a long round of hostilities on the Suez front between Egyptian and
Israeli forces.

These hostilities, which were known as the War of

Attrition, extended for 1,000 days between 1968-70.

It caused many

casualties for both parties but no territorial changes occured.

The

fifth round of major hostilities between Egypt and Israel were to come
three years later in the October War of 1973.

The October War of 1973
Between 1971 and 1973 the Nixon Administration tried to act as a
mediator between Egypt and Israel towards the aim of bringing lasting
peace between the two countries.

A political formula was proposed by

Secretary of State William Rogers in October 1971.

U.S. Assistant

Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, traveled between the two countries
several times without any lasting accomplishment.

The Israeli
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Government assured the Nixon Administration of its desire not to return
to the boundary prior to 1967 and its insistance on exercising control
over Sharm esh-Sheikh.

Other efforts were made by UN mediator Gunnar

Jarring.
The possibility of negotiations between the two countries failed to
materialize.

This situation led to the creation of a climate of

inevitable continuing confrontation.

During the last two years prior to

October 1973, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat was under domestic
pressure to initiate war against Israel to restore the Sinai peninsula.
Several thousand students demonstrated in the streets of Cairo on many
occasions·, demanding "arming [of] the masses" (Sobel, 1974, p. 55).
The war which followed has been referred to by many names,
including the Ramadan War and the Yorn Kippur War.

It erupted at 2:00

P.M. on October 6, 1973, along the Egyptian and Syrian fronts with
Israel.

After 24 hours of fighting, the Egyptian forces succeeded in

crossing the Suez Canal occupying the famous Israeli fortification known
as the Bar-Lev Line.

On the other hand, Israeli forces later succeeded

in crossing the canal to the west side and isolated the Egyptian Third
Army in a counterattack.

The Soviet Union and the United States became

deeply involved in the war, resupplying the parties with new weapons.
Both countries initiated a major airlift of military equipment to
compensate the parties for their losses.

Moreover, the two superpowers

threatened to intervene and the U.S. military was, for a limited time,
in a state of high alert.

The United Nations Security Council debated

the hostilities; actions were taken on the 8, 9, and 11 October, but it
failed to adopt any resolutions or actions to bring about the end of the
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hostilities.

The Nixon administration initiated a proposal for a cease

fire, calling for a cession of hostilities and a return to positions
held before the eruption of the war (Sobel, 1974, p. 91).

On October 17

the representative of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exportation
Countries (OAPEC) passed a resolution cutting oil supplies to the United
States and Western European countries.

These attempts were made to

bring about a change in U.S. policy in the Middle East.
On October 22, 1973, the Security Council adopted its first
resolution, No. 338, regarding the war calling for an immediate cease
fire.

The Resolution was sponsored by both superpowers.

The resolution

called for the implementation of UN Resolution 242 adopted in November
1967 and a beginning of negotiations between Israel and the Arab states.
Violations of the truce, especially by Israel which continued to fight
to the west of the Canal, led to two other resolutions on October 23 and
25, Nos. 339 and 340 respectively, recalling the first Resolution of
October 22 and deciding to send United Nations Emergency Forces to the
areas of hostilities.

Within a bit more than one year, by mid-January

of 1975, 7,000 UN peace-keeping forces were stationed in a buffer zone
between the two parties.
The U.S. was involved in intense diplomatic activity during the war
to stop the hostilities.

The U.S., led by Secretary of State Henry

Kissinger, sponsored a six-point truce between the two countries.
agreement was endorsed by both parties on November 9.

The

The six-point

agreement included food supplies to Suez City (which was under seige)
and an agreement to discuss the separation of forces and disengagement
under the auspices of the United Nations (Sobel, 1974, p. 93).
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The First Disengagement Agreement
While the major confrontations between Egypt and Israel in 1948,
1956, and 1967 ended with clear military victories for Israel, the 1973
War ended without so obvious a winner.

The war left both parties

standing on new and vulnerable lines, from which neither side could
tolerate a suprise attack from the other.

It was obvious that both

parties were interested in a separation of forces to new, defensible
lines.
The disengagement negotiations started in a tent at kilometer 101
on the Suez-Cairo highway.

General Gamasy and General Yarev were the

representatives of Egypt and Israel respectively.

U.S. Secretary of

State Henry Kissinger was behind the scenes pushing for a positive
conclusion to the talks.
essential.

The U.S. role in the negotiations was

It wanted to derive a credit which would influence the Arab

oil producers to lift their embargo and to promote its position in the
Arab world (Touval, 1982, p. 243).

During the negotiations "shuttle

diplomacy" was employed by Kissinger between Tel-Aviv and Cairo until
the agreement was signed on January 18, 1974, with the chiefs of staff
of both countries and General Siilasvue (the Commander of UNEF) in
attendance.

The United States offered incentives to Egypt and continued

military aid to Israel in order to encourage both parties to sign the
agreement.
According to Article B of the agreement, Israel was to withdraw its
forces from the west to the east side of the canal and concentrate
behind line B (see Figure 20).

The Egyptian forces on the east side of

the Suez Canal were to be deployed to the west of the line designated as
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line A.

Paragraph 2 of Article B stated:

"The area between the

Egyptian and Israeli lines will be a zone of disengagement in which the
United Nations Emergency Forces will be stationed."
eight kilometers in width.

The buffer zone was

Moreover, the agreement limited the Egyptian

forces between line A and the Suez Canal to an area of a depth of about
eight kilometers and the Israeli forces between lines Band C (Sobel,
1974, p. 156).

The Egyptian Government did not succeed in regaining the

important strategic passes at Mitla and Gidi.
was completed on March 4.

The separation of forces

One week earlier Egypt resumed diplomatic

relations with the U.S. which had been severed since the 1967 War (Metz,
1991, p. 301).

The Second Disengagement Agreement
The Nixon Administration exploited the new circumstances of
negotiation between Israel and the Arab states.

On May 31, 1974, U.S.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger succeeded in bringing Israel and
Syria to a disengagement agreement.

The U.S. wanted to keep the

momentum and continue to lead activities to bring peace to the Middle
East.

During the first half of 1974, Middle East issues were the top

priorities of the U.S. administration.

The second attempt to bring

Egypt and Israel to a new disengagement agreement succeeded in September
1975.

Since the first agreement, President Anwar Sadat had continued to

press for further withdrawals of Israeli troops so he could open the
Suez Canal and strengthen his ability to protect it.
political agreement between the two countries.

Israel demanded a

It wanted the abolition

of the state of belligerence and an end to economic warfare against
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Israel.

Israel rejected the Egyptian demand of withdrawal from the

strategic passes and the oil fields on the western coast of Sinai.

On

March 22 Henry Kissinger concluded his efforts due to inability to bring
the parties to a new agreement.
The U.S. administration turned to a carrot and stick policy.

It

delayed economic and military assistance to Israel and signaled to the
Israeli Government the necessity for further compromises.

After

inviting leaders of both countries, Prime Minister Rabin and President
Sadat, both parties agreed to the essential points.

Secretary of State

Henry Kissinger returned in the middle of August to another shuttle of
diplomatic efforts in the Middle East and on September 1,1975,
representatives of both counties signed the second agreement;
The second agreement was modeled after the first one, but with
three buffer zones between the two parties and areas with limited forces
and armaments (see Figure 21).

It was limited in time and the agreement

needed annual renewal by the Security Council.

Israel agreed to vacate

the oil fields and the strategic passes (Touval, 1982, pp. 262-266).
Early warning systems were established by both sides to monitor the
troop movements of the other.

The Egyptian early-warning station was

very close to the Israeli line, and the Israeli station was within the
buffer zone farther to the west.

The United States convinced both

parties to be present in the buffer zone beside the UN forces.

U.S.

civilian personnel were to monitor the activities of both parties in the
early warning stations for a range of agreed functions.

In the poliical

arena, Egypt agreed to ease the economic boycott against Israel and
agreed to Israeli passage of non-military ships and cargos through the
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Suez Canal.

Both parties agreed to solve their problems by peaceful

means and not to resort to the use of force (Touval, 1982, pp. 262-66).
In the course of implementing the Second Disengagement Agreement, a
new political reality began to arise.

Egypt became more and tolerant of

the U.S. approach as political activities to bring about a lasting peace
continued.

A dramatic visit to Israel by Egyptian President Anwar Al-

Sadat in November 1977 led to further peace negotiations, concluding in
the Camp David Agrement of 1978.

A peace treaty between Egypt and

Israel was signed under the auspices of the Carter Administration on
March 26, 1979.
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CHAPTER 8
THE EGYPT-ISRAEL BOUNDARY III, 1980-1992

The Israeli Withdrawal From Sinai
Following development of the "framework for peace" in the Middle
East agreed upon at Camp David, dated September 17, 1978, and the
signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of March 26, 1979, another
phase of change in the Egypt-Israel boundary had begun to occur.
Paragraph II of Article I of the Treaty stated:

"Israel will withdraw

all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the
international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine and Egypt
will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai."
Article II stated:
The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the
recognized international boundary between Egypt and the
former mandated territory of Palestine without prejudice of
the issue of the status of Gaza Strip. The parties
recognize this boundary as inviolable. (The EgyptianIsraeli Treaty, 1979, p. 4)
Moreover, the Treaty, in Annex I, set out stages and a time table for
the Israeli withdrawal.
As a security arrangement between the two countries, the Sinai
peninsula was at one time divided by 2 lines of longitude--A and B--and
was further divided into three zones (see Figure 22).

Zone A is bounded

by the west bank of the Suez Canal and the east coast of the Gulf of
Suez.

Zone B extended from the red line to the green line in the middle

of the desert.

The new arrangement established Zone C, bounded by line

Bon the west and the international boundary with Israel and the Gulf of
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Aqaba on the east.

Zones A and C meet in the south of the Sinai

peninsula from Jabal Katrinah, approximately, to Sharm esh-Sheikh.
While the Egyptian armed forces were permitted to occupy Zone A
with mechanized forces, infantry, artillery, tanks, etc. and to occupy
Zone B with light weapons, they were not allowed to be stationed in Zone
C.

Only Egyptian civil police and United Nations forces were to be

active there.

On the other side of the international boundary, Zone D

was established.

This Zone, which has a width of two miles and is

bounded by line Dis located in the Israeli territories.

Israel is not

allowed to station heavy weapons in this area (Annex I, Article II of
the Peace Treaty, 1979, p. 8).

Both Israel and Egypt established early

warning systems in Zones D and A respectively.
According to the peace treaty, as Israeli troops withdrew, the
United Nations forces were to replace them in the evacuated areas to
establish a buffer zone between the two armies (Article I-C appendix to
Annex I of the Peace Treaty, 1979, p. 15).

The Israeli withdrawal

started two months after the peace treaty was signed.

The first phase

of the pullout began on May 25, 1979, with Israeli troops withdrawing
from the northern part of the Sinai peninsula, including the town of ElArish, the most strategic and highly populated city in the region (see
Figure 23).

Other stages of the pullout followed.

By June 1980, Israel

completed its withdrawal from Zones A and B to the interim withdrawal
line and a buffer zone was established between the two forces.

By this

date Egypt controlled 45,000 km2 out of the 61,000 km2 in the Sinai
peninsula area (Abdel-Hai, 1991).

The final phase of withdrawal came 20

months later when Israel evacuated the strategic straits of Tiran in
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the gate of the Gulf of Aqaba, Sharm esh-Sheikh, and the Jewish
settlements in the west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba and in the area
between Rafah and El-Arish on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea.
After completing the withdrawal United Nations peacekeeping forces
were stationed in Zone C along the border with Israel and in Sharm eshSheikh.

The multinational peacekeeping forces in Sinai relied heavily

on American troops who had performed a peacekeeping role in Sinai since
the Second Disengagement Agreement of 1975.

Out of 2,500 members of the

multinational force of observers (MFO), 1,200 were American, most of
them from the 82nd Airborne Division (Mullin, 1982, p. 26).

The role of

the MFO was to monitor the Egyptian-Israeli boundary and the
implementation of the agreement regarding troop movements.

In 1992

these forces were still stationed there.

The Rafah Problem
The members of the joint commission of Israelis and Egyptians
established to demarcate the international boundary were in disagreement
on how to treat Palestinians who lived to the south of the international
border.

In the early 1970s, Israeli authorities transferred thousands

of Palestinians from the northern part of the Gaza Strip to western
sections of the southern Palestinian town of Rafah, i.e., beyond the
international boundary into Egyptian territory.

In addition, the

international boundary between Israel and Egypt had become an
administrative one during the occupation of 1967-79.

The Palestinian

population, which experiences one of the highest rates of natural
increase in the world at 3.2%, had expanded into Egyptian territory
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(Benvenisti, M. & Khayat, S., 1988, p. 109).

While Egypt demanded the

reimposition of the international boundary of 1906, Israel proposed
changes to include Rafah and its new western suburbs within the Gaza
Strip (Silver, 1982, p. 35).

Egypt refused any change in the boundary

and demanded the transfer of Palestinians to areas within the Gaza
Strip.

A joint task force demarcated the boundary, which cut through

streets and houses (and families) within Rafah the town and the "Canada"
refugee camp (a legacy of the Canadian United Nations force stationed
there during 1957-67).

The joint task force agreed to remove the

Palestinians from their homes in the Canada refugee camp and to resettle
them within the Gaza Strip.

With the help of the United Nations Relief

and Works Agency (UNRWA), most of the residents resettled in TalEssultan, Al-Amal, and "Brazil" building projects ("Brazil" being
another remnant of the 1957-67 period) (see Figure 24).

Today, the

boundary is made up of two systems of barbed wire fences six meters high
and fifty meters wide--a created "no man's land."

The fences divide the

two-thirds Israeli-occupied Palestinian Rafah from the Egyptian third of
the same town (Cohen, 1986, p. 28).

The Taha Dispute
The Egypt-Israel boundary extends 210 km from a point near Rafah on
the Mediterranean Sea to Taha on the Gulf of Aqaba coast.
was demarcated in 1906 by 91 pillars.

The boundary

After the Israeli withdrawal of

1982, 14 pillar locations were disputed between the countries with a
total area of 10.29 km2 (Mitwali, 1989, pp. 313-315) (see Figure 25).
During the 1967-79 occupation of the Sinai when the 1906 boundary
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functioned effectively as an administrative one, Israel did not renew
the boundary pillars.
areas:

The disputed pillars were located in three main

(a) the northern part of the boundary (9 pillars), (b) the 4

pillars at Ras-en-Nakab area, and (c) pillar No. 91 in Taha, the most
important one.
Disputed Area No. 1 (The northern part)
The area disputed in this part of the boundary totals only 0.79
km2 •

Some of the main factors behind the dispute were the following:

(a) the area is geographically a desert and unpopulated, meaning
changing desert features add difficulty in keeping the pillars; (b) the
northern area of the boundary had been a theater for hostilities since
1948; (c) both states had been negligent in renewing the boundary
pillars to good condition; (d) since its inception in 1906, the boundary
was an administrative one for most of its history (Elkosheri, 1990, p.
20), and the pillars were less important.

(see Table 2)

Disputed Area No. 2 (Ras en Nagb)
The area disputed is the largest among the three areas (8.3 km2).
The strategic importance of this area was the cause of this dispute.
Elevation is approximately 800 meters, the highest point in that region.
From that area there is a clear view to the east over Elat and south
into the Sinai peninsula.

Moreover, the area is very rigid, making

movement very difficult, and contains an important crossroad which links
Sinai with the Gaza Strip in the north and Elat in the east (Lesch,
1989, p. 97). (see Table 3)
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Table 2
Disputed Area No. 1

Location (Pillars)

Dispute (Distance)

Egyptian Claim

Israeli Claim

1

No. 7

55 meters

straight line
between
pillars No. 5
and No. 8

westerly
direction
from the
straight line
between
pillar No. 5
and No. 8

2

No. 14

15 meters

easterly
location

westerly
location

3

No. 15

15 meters

easterly
location

westerly
location

4

No. 17

25 meters

straight line
from No. 19
via No. 18

westerly
direction

5

No. 27

1. 9 meters

easterly
location

westerly
location

6

No. 46

3 meters

easterly
location

westerly
location

7

No. 51

3 meters

easterly
location

westerly
location

8

No. 52

126 meters

straight .line
between No. 51
and No. 53

southwesterly
direction
between
No. 51 and
No. 53

9

No. 56

3 meters

easterly
location

westerly
location

Note.

(Government of Israel, 1988, pp. 154-170; Mitwali, 1989, p. 313).
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Table 3
Disputed Area No. 2

Location (Pillars)

Dispute (Distance)

Egyptian Claim

Israeli Claim

1) No. 85

2571 meters

easterly
location

westerly
location

2) No. 86

1740 meters

easterly
location

westerly
location

3) No. 87

1655 meters

easterly
location

westerly
location

4) No. 88

45 meters

easterly
location

westerly
location

Note.

(Government of Israel, 1988, p. 172; Mitwali, 1989, p. 314).

Disputed Area No. 3 (Taba)
The disputed area around the location of pillar No. 91 was the
focus of the most heated debate.
approximately 1,000 meters.

The disputed area at Taba extended for

While Egypt claimed an eastern location on

the top of Taba Hill, Israel claimed two possible locations farther west
to include the west bank of Taba Valley (Government of Israel, 1986, p.
174; Mitwali, 1989, p. 296-97) (see Figure 26) (see Table 3).
The importance of Taba, a 1.2 km sq. area, derived from five
considerations.
1.

According to Mohammed Abu-Gazala, the former Egyptian defense

minister, Taba is a gateway to the Mitla and Gidi passes in central
Sinai (Abdel Hai, 1991, p. 90).
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Figure 26.

Taha Dispute over the Location of Pillar 91.
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2.

Taba contains an important crossroads to Gaza and El-Arish in

the north and· Sharm esh-Sheikh in the south.
3.

Taba was a tourist attraction, possessing a scenic coastline

and developed with a 12-storey hotel and recreation village.
4.

Although it is a small area, it borders four different

countries:
5.

Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and, effectively, Saudi Arabia.

Israel has a very narrow coast on the Red Sea.

The Taba plane

is the potential extension of the area around Elat (Abdel Hai, 1991, p.
90; Al-Rashidi, 1990, p. 81; Lesch, 1989, p. 96).

The Taba Arbitration
Article VII of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty states:

"Disputes

arising out of the application or interpretation of this treaty shall be
resolved by negotiation."

Moreover, "[A]ny such disputes which cannot

be settled by negotiation shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted
to arbitration."

The Israeli army and civilians completed their

evacuation of Sinai on April 25, 1982.

The war in Lebanon which started

40 days later found the Israeli government distracted from dealing with
the boundary dispute.
the invasion.

In addition,- Israel-Egypt relations cooled after

With the help of mediation organized with the support of

the Reagan adminis.tration, the two countries agreed to move to the line
claimed by the other side and the area between the two lines to be under
MFO jurisdiction (Al-Rashid, ,1990, p. 106; Lesch, 1989, p. 96).
During the years 1983-86, Egypt wanted a mandatory solution to the
problem which demanded the solving of the fourteen disputed points by
arbitration, but the Israeli government insisted upon conciliation.

In

123
September 1986, after four years of negotiations, they finally agreed to
arbitration.

The two countries set the conditions, rules, and time

tables, plus agreed on an arbitration panel led by former president of
the Swedish Supreme Court, Judge Gunnar Lagergen.

The arbitrations

refer to the location of the boundary's disputed pillars after the
demarcation of 1906 and at the time of the British Mandate of Palestine.
Moreover, it was agreed that the tribunal did not have the power to
suggest locations for the pillars other than those claimed by Egypt or
Israel (Lesch, 1989, p. 111; El-Kosheri, 1990, p. 10).
On May 13, 1987, each country submitted to the arbitration panel
its memorial explaining its claims supported by documents and maps.
Later on June 12 of that year, both parties submitted their responses to
the other's position (counter-memorials).

Each responded to the

opposing side's claims adding supporting documents and maps.

The final

phase of the arbitration was the rejoinder of each country which was
submitted on March 1, 1988.

Both countries submitted general

observations and additional pieces of evidence which referred to old
claims at critical points and responses to the.counter-memorials.
During the arbitration process, the legal adviser of the U.S. Department
of State, Abraham Sofer, tried unsuccessfully to reach an out-of-court
settlement (Abdel Hai, 1991, p. 123).

The tribunal, which held its

meetings in Geneva, visited the disputed.points on February 17, 1988
(Al-Rashidi, 1990~ p. 108).
On September 29, 1988, the arbitration tribunal gave its decision
publicly regarding the 14 disputed points.
Egyptian claims in 10 out of the 14.

It decided in favor of the

Israel won on the less important
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points in the boundary where only a few square meters were in question.
The tribunal decided in favor of Egypt in the following boundary·
pillars:

7, 17, 27, 51 and 52 in the northern sector of the boundary,

and pillars 85, 86, 87 and 88 in Ras en Naqb irt the southern sector, and
in the most important pillar location, No. 91 in Taba (Mitwali, 1989,
pp. 372-73; Al-Rashidi, 1990, p. 135).
The tribunals decisions were based on several points.
1.

The tribunal did not accept Israel's claim of mistaken

demarcation in 1906 or the claim that some pillars were originally not
sited properly based on the 1906 accord, although some revelant evidence
exists (see Chapter 4).

The panel was concerned only with the correct

location of the pillars as originally sited (Lesch, 1989, p. 95).
2.
1948.

Israel penetrated the boundary and occuped part of Sinai in
It signed an armistice demarcation agreement with Egypt and never

claimed sovereignty over Taba or the other disputed points (Lesch,
1989, p. 95; Rizk, 1989, p. 48).
3.

The situation was similar in 1956, when Israel occupied Sinai

and withdrew after a few months.

The UN peacekeeping forces, which were

stationed in the border between 1956-67, confirmed the Egyptian
claims (Rizik, 1989, p. 49).
4.
91.

Israel was not confident about the exact location of pillar No.

It suggested to the tribunal two possible sites:

91A at.the

granite knob and 91B at Bir Taba (Rejoinder of Israel, 1988, pp. 13132) (see Figure 26).
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5.

The pillars were constructed in 1906 according to the principle

of intervisibility, that each pillar can be seen from the one adjacent
to it, and the court maintained this principle (Rizik, 1989, p. 329).
· The_ Egyptian delegation had been able to bring to the tribunal two
different official Israeli maps, the first from 1964 with Bir Taba about
700 meters west of the boundary, i.e. within Egypt, and the second from
1983 which shows the. same place 300 meters east of the boundary, i.e.
within Israel (Rizik, 1989, p. 357).
Israel accepted arbitration and withdrew from the Taba area on
March 15, 1989.

The disputed pillars were fixed according to the

tribunal's decisions.

Egypt paid $40 million in compensation to Israeli

developers hotel owner in Taba (Abdel Hai, 1991, p. 240).

Immigration and Settlement
Since the early days, the World Zionist Organization had been
interested in purchasing land along the Egyptian frontier.· Several
attempts to acquire land in the Egyptian frontier occured.

In 1890 a

Jewish activist named Pol Friedman leading a group of twenty Jewish
people tried to settle on the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba (El-Deeb, 1979,
pp. 115-16).

In 1903, the founder of the World Zionist Organization,

Theodore Hertz!, suggested the establishment of a Jewish State in ElArish and the Sinai peninsula (Jolan, 1987, p. 7).

Other attempts to

acquire lands in Rafah and El-Arish occurred in 1905 and in 1907, but
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all of these were rejected by Lord Cromer (Walach, 1975, p. 38), though
Cromer thought they had influenced Ottoman attitudes in 1906 (see chapt.

4).
The creation of the 1906 boundary didn't discourage Jewish attempts
at settlement in the Egyptian frontier.

In 1919, President Weizmann

wrote to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, to ask for an
apportionment of "the desolated land in southern Erets Yisrael for
Jewish settlement" (Waingradov, 1965, p. 303).
The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 permitted further
Jewish settlement along the Egyptian frontier.

In the late 1940s and

early 1950s several Jewish settlements were erected, the most wellknown being Elat on the Red Sea (near the former Urnrn-Rashrash), and
Nizzana (the former Auja), Gevolot and .Kerem Shalom in the northern
edges of the boundary (Atlas of Israel, 1970, pp. 1, 12).

The concept

of frontier settlements is well-known in the thinking of Israeli policymakers.

This doctrine holds that Jewish settlements on the frontiers

help to stablize and shape the boundary.
way of thinking.

Many factors influence this

The Israeli government since 1967 has accelerated the

construction of settlements alongside the boundary and inside the
occupied territories for several reasons (Naveh, 1975, pp. 26-27).
1.

In the Israeli view, its borders are disproportionately long in

comparison to its territory, rendering the borders very difficult to
defend, especially when surrounded by hostile neighbors.
2.

The size of the Israeli armed forces and its military

capability in the event of confrontations with Arab states along the
borders is thought to be out of balance with the military capabilities
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of the surrounding Arab countries.

Building settlements near. the

borders is taken to enhance Israel's capability.
3.

Some Israeli commentators argue that the Israeli Government

built settlements to make compromise very difficult.
4.

The settlements on the frontiers improve the morale of Israeli

soldiers and civilians in the urban and interior areas.
5.

In the case of negotiations, cease-fire lines are often taken

to be not as permanent as settlement lines.

Concentrating Jewish

settlements along Israel's frontiers is seen to enhance the government's
position in peace negotiations.
According to Dani Rozoluo, an Israeli official, the last campaign
in the 1948 War was a settlement campaign on the frontier.

Military

units were taken to settlements on the frontier to protect it (Rozoluo,
1975, p. 43).
The occupation of the Sinai peninsula and Gaza Strip in June of
1967 was followed by the establishment of Jewish settlements across
those areas.

On the eve of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai there were 19

settlements.

Eleven were in Pethat Rafiah, i.e. in the area between

Rafah and El-Arish, and the other 8 settlements were scattered
throughout the peninsula (see Figure 27).
lived there (Mullin, 1982, p. 25).

Five thousand Jewish settlers

By 1990 there were 19 Jewish

settlements in the Gaza Strip inhabited by approximately 5000 settlers
(The Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1991-1992; United Nations Relief
Works Agency, 1990, p. 1).

Israel withdrew from these settlements in

April, 1982, as a result of the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and
Israel (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p. 293).
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Functions of the Boundary and Economic Relations
Since its establishment, the Egypt-Palestin/Israel boundary has
passed through different phases of development which have affected
its function.

Prior to World War I the boundary was formal.

After the

delimitation of 1906, Bedouins continued to cross it for their own
purposes.

Between the two world wars the boundary became an

administrative one between the British Protectorate of Egypt and in the
northern and eastern Sinai and the British administration of the Negev.
The British authorities enforced measures of supervision over the
movement of Bedouins for tax matters and to prevent smuggling and
violence (Brawer, 1979, p. 373).
The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the Armistice
demarcation line which followed drastically altered the boundary in its
functions.

With movements of the Bedouin tribes sealed, many tribes

were either deported or moved into the Egyptian territories.

Between

the years 1949-67, following Jewish settlements on the frontier with
Egypt, the boundary became an ethnic one separating two ethnic groups,
Arabs and Jews (Brawer, 1979, p. 374).
The occupation of Gaza Strip and Sinai in 1967 changed the nature
of the boundary back from international-political to administrative.
Due to intensive Jewish settlement during 1967-79, especially in the
northern boundary sector, the border was opened for free movement.

The

Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the evacuation of the Jewish
settlements restored the boundary to an international and ethnic
separation line.

The peace Treaty of .1979 specified that "full, normal

diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt would be established"
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(Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, 1979, p·. 24).

As Israel started its

pullout from Sinai in 1979, the two countries established diplomatic
relations.

In 1980, three traffic check points along the boundary were

opened, two of them along the edges of the boundary in Rafah and Taba.
Both checkpoints opened to serve the movement of tourists and trade.
The last checkpoint is in Nissana and serves trade movement only.
In 1979 and 1980, Israel and Egypt signed 55 separate commercial,
cultural and scientific exchange agreements (Smith, 1983, p. 17).

In

the trade arena, oil is the leading commodity between the two countries.
As part of the Peace Treaty, Egypt is providing Israel 40,000 barrels of
oil per day.

The value of the oil trade in 1982 was estimated at $600

million (Benin, 1985, p. 6).

Other Egyptian trade with Israel ammounted

to $700 million in 1982 and $800 million in the first eight months of
1983 (Smith, 1983, p. 17).

Israel tried to balance its trade with Egypt

mainly with agricultural products.
totaled $12 million.

In 1980 Israeli exports to Egypt

It rose to $25 million in 1982, but due to the

Israeli invasion of Lebanon, export figures dropped to $6 million in the
first three quarters of 1983 (Smith, 1983, p. 17).

The cold peace

between the two countries following the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai
was based on the Taba dispute, the invasion of Lebanon, and the
unprogressive nature of negotiations over the issue of "autonomy" for
Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

All these factors

prevented Egypt from normalization of relations and cooperation with
Israel.
The dramatic element in trade came with Israeli tourists visiting
Egypt.

This tourist trade was one-sided and was strongly affected by
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the political conditions following the Peace Treaty . .Besides air
services between the two countries, there is a daily bus service from
Tel-Aviv to Cairo via the Rafah checkpoint.

Tens of thousands of

Israelis benefited from the agreement signed in October of 1981 in
allowing tourism between the two countries.
few Egyptians have visited Israel.

However, in contrast, very

In 1982, 30,000 Israelis visited

Egypt but only 4,300 Egyptians made their way to Israel.

For the first

three quarters of 1983 the figures dropped to 25,000 and 1,800
respectively.

Between 1979-83, 200,000 Israelis visisted Egypt (Miller,

1983, p. 16).

Despite incidents of violence against Israeli tourists in

Egypt, Israelis--especially Palestinians with Israeli passports-continue to travel to Egypt.

The maximum figure of Egyptian tourists

visiting Israel was 5,100 in 1987.

In 1988, 3,741 Egyptians visited

Israel and 4,235 and 3,348 in the following years respectively
(Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1991, pp. 58-62).
Although the two countries hoped for more cooperation and mass
movement through the border, especially Israel, the normalization
process with its three-dimensional diplomatic, economic, and cultural
channels was greatly influenced by the total political environment in
the region.

At a seminar held in 1989 by the Jaffa Center for Strategic

Studies at the University of Tel-Aviv to discuss the "ten years of peace
with Egypt", some scholars argued that the main factor which determines
Egyptian foreign policy with Israel is its own domestic problems, since
it is a society with a large natural increase in population.

The

conflict in the Middle East was interpreted a struggle between two
systems with different values and interpretations.

Conditions such as
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these make it very difficult for warm relations to exist between
Egyptians and Israelis.

Egypt maintains the position that the core of

the Israeli-Arab conflict is the Palestinians:

if this problem is

solved, the others will be solved by themselves (Mirhav, 1989, p. 64).
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CHAPTER 9
SUMMARY

This essay has provided a continuous descriptive account of the
Egypt-Palestine/Israel boundary from 1841 to present.

The roots of the

Egypt-Palestine/Israeli boundary originated in Mohammed Ali's ambition
to seize ultimate power in the region when he invaded Syria in 1831.
The intervention of European powers forced Ali to withdraw his troops
from Syria.

In return the Sultan of Istanbul gave Ali's lineage

hereditary rule over Egypt.

In his Firman of 1841, the Sultan

determined the eastern limits of Egypt by a straight line extended from
Suez to a point between Rafah and Khan Yonis on the Mediterranean coast.
It served as an administrative line within the Ottoman Empire.

Ali did

not accept the new line and continued to exercise control over Sinai and
three forts along the west coast of Arabia for the coming decades.

The

operation of the Suez Canal in 1869 increased European rivalry and
colonial activity in the area.

This rivalry began earlier in India and

was followed by Napolean's occupation of Egypt in 1798.

The British,

who were the main users of and benefactors from the Suez Canal, desired
strong unilateral control over the area to protect their highly
strategic maritime route to India.

The French wanted to gain maximum

political and economic benefits as the ones responsible for building the
canal and, moreover, wanted to disrupt the British route to India.
Facing a real internal threat by an Egyptian nationalist movement and
the state of economic bankruptcy and anarchy which existed in Egypt at
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that time, Great Britain moved to take advantage of the situation by
occupying Egypt in 1882.
Unlike other provinces within the Ottoman Empire, Egypt always had
a certain degree of autonomy.
1806-48.

This increased during Ali's reign from

The British occupation of Egypt enhanced this trend towards

weakening of Ottoman control.

One of the most important goals of the

British invasion of Egypt was the protection of the Suez Canal.

The

issue of the eastern Egyptian boundary was on the British agenda in
1892.

In his Firman of investiture to Khedive Abbas II Hilmi, the

Ottoman Sultan failed to mention Sinai and the eastern Egyptian
boundary.

The British Government represented by Lord Cromer, the

British Agent in Egypt, demanded and received a new Firman, stating:
"the status quo is maintained in the same manner as it was administered
at the time of your grandfather [of Khedive Abbas II Hilmi] . . . and
your father" (Toye, 1989, p. 59).

For the British it was formal

acknowledgement of the Egyptian (British) rule over Sinai.
The issue of the boundary arose early in January 1906 when the
British Governor of Egypt started to take greater interest in Sinai and
the eastern border.

A geopolitical power struggle ensued between the

Britian and Ottoman empires which came close to a military
confrontation.

The British wanted to keep the Sinai peninsula as a

buffer zone to protect the Suez Canal and did not accept several
proposed Ottoman compromises, thus forcing the demarcation of the RafahAqaba line upon the Ottomans.

In accordance with an agreement signed

between Cairo and Istanbul on September 13, 1906, a joint commission
demarcated the 210 km line as an administrative one within the Ottoman
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Empire.

They constructed 91 pillars keeping the principle of

intervisibility between the pillars.

The British, being well aware of

the Ottoman weaknesses, achieved their goals and controlled both sides
of the Suez Canal.
The end of the First World War brought a new reality to the Middle
East as well as the rest of the world.

The defeat of Turkey and its

renunciation of any title over Egypt, Palestine, and the rest of its
former empire, led to new arrangements between the European powers.
Beginning in 1922, Great Britain was awarded, as a Mandate, Palestine.
Earlier, during 1918-20, there were several proposals made to change the
Rafah-Aqaba line, but the 1906 line remained as a compromise between
several suggested lines.
Although there were some appeals made and legal questions raised
about the sovereignty of Egypt over Sinai, the Rafah-Aqaba line survived
and emerged as a stable and permanent boundary.

The dramatic events of

two world wars, Egypt's independence, the British Mandate over
Palestine, the United Nation's Partition Plan of 1947, and the creation
of the State of Israel in 1948: all of these events failed to alter the
Rafah-Aqaba line of 1906.
For the first time since its demarcation, the boundary changed when
Egypt and Israel signed the Armistice Agreement of February 1949.

The

Armistice Line followed the boundary line of 1906, except around Gaza
Strip; however, the boundary's status changed in terms of its definition
as a boundary line only, not as a political or territorial border.
Moreover, the boundary became sealed to movement and served as an ethnic
separation line, with a demilitarized zone established around Auja on
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the Israeli side of the border and limited defensive positions in the
area allowed within Egypt opposing .the Auja area.

As one of the

outcomes of the Agreement, the Gaza Strip was formed in.the souththwest
corner of Palestine.
The triple attack on Egypt in 1956 by Israel, France and Great
Britain led to a temporary change in the boundary line.

For a brief

period, Israel had a line extended for a great distance alongside the
Suez Canal, just 10 km distant.

Moreover, after the Israeli withdrawal,

the 1956 War brought certain changes in the border system.

While the

boundary line itself remained untouched, United Nations Emergency Forces
entered S·inai in 1957 to monitor the border in the coming ten years.
During 1957-67, the Egypt-Israel border was the quietest among the ArabIsraeli borders.
This situation was altered during the first half of 1967.

Tensions

escalated along the border between Israel and Egypt due to tensions
along other Syrian-Israeli frontiers and the Egyptian decisions to close
the Straits of Tiran to ships sailing to Elat and to send the United
Nations Emergency Forces home in May 1967.

Following a strike on June 5

of that year, the sealed armistice line of 1949 was altered in its
nature and location, replaced by a cease fire line along the Suez Canal
and the Gulf of Suez.

The Rafah-Aqaba line became an administrative

line between Israel and the territories of Sinai and the Gaza Strip
which it occupied.

While the Armistice demarcation system was based on

bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1949, the cease fire
system was based on United Nations resolutions.

The nature of the cease
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fire system was unstable.

Although it.survived the War of Attrition of

1969-71, it collapsed in October 1973.
The October War of 1973-which was initiated by Egypt and Syria-and
its military and geopolitical.outcomes led to intense political
activity.

PossiQle confrontations between the superpowers during the

war, the subsequent oil embargo, and the new lines created by the
Egyptian and Israeli militaries .convinced Washington and Moscow that the
status quo on the Middle East was no longer bearable.

After intensive

diplomatic efforts in the area by the Nixon Administration,. Egypt and
Israel concluded two disengagement agreements.
1974, and the second was in Septemeber 1975.

The first was in January
The disengagement front

line system differed from the former cease fire and Armistice systems.
While it was similar to the Armistice system as a bilateral agreement,
it differed in that it was limited in time, and required annual renewal
by the Security Council of the United Nations.

Moreover, the

disengagement agreement was based on three lines, not one, as were the
previous systems.

It followed the principle of establishing a

demilitarized zone controlled by UN forces which separated a thin zone
of light Egyptian and Israeli forces.
The momentum of political activity continued after the Second
Disengagement Agreement of September 1975.
President Anwar El-Sadat visited Israel.

In November 1977, Egyptian
The conclusion of the Camp

David Agreement followed, as did the Peace Treaty of 1979.

Israel

withdrew from the Sinai peninsula during 1979-82 and moved back behind
the Rafah-Aqaba line.

The few locations along the boundary line which
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were disputed were finalized after arbitration accepted by the two
countries.
The 1906 boundary antecedent by 42 years to the establishment of
the State of Israel has survived many dramatic events.

Although it was

penetrated several times in both directions, it remains as it was
demarcated in 1906.

The boundary line, superimposed by imperial

interests, gained ultimate permanence and stability after the EgyptIsrael Peace Treaty of 1982.

It functions in 1992 as a mutually

accepted international boundary and allows citizens interaction between
states.
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